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Summary
This dissertation provides evidence that information displays to support procedure
following can aid performance and increase situational awareness and safety.  The intent
of such displays is to assist operators in not only following operational procedures, but
also in comprehending the context of the procedures, enabling them to understand why,
when, and how to deviate from the procedures if necessary.
The results of the dissertation research support several important and novel
conclusions.  First, the results show that the addition of procedure context increases
situation awareness and reduces procedure-following errors, which has been shown to be
a significant causative factor for accidents in aviation and other domains. Secondly, the
results demonstrate that dynamic displays can be used for this purpose.  Pilots were able
to understand and utilize the information on the displays without additional workload.  .
Despite their interest in, and ability to, detect noncompliance, a pilot’s ability to
comprehend noncompliance appears to be limited.  Pilots do not appear be able to
interpret the consequences of that noncompliance, suggesting that the design of displays
and procedures should assist them in doing so.
In addition, the results demonstrate that pilots attempted to use procedure
information even when clearly outside the scope of the procedure.  This means that
procedures and procedure-support aids should consider operation outside of its normal
bounds in their design, rather than only for nominal operation as is currently the case.
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Chapter 1
Introduction, Motivation, and Contribution
In this dissertation I intend to show that information displays to support the
execution of operational procedures can aid performance and increase situational
awareness and safety.  I will also provide guidance for the design of such displays. The
intent of such displays is to assist operators in not only following operational procedures,
but also in comprehending the context of the procedures, enabling them to understand
why, when, and how to deviate from the procedures if necessary.  An existing design
methodology - procedure context – will provide guidance on the content of displays for
this purpose (Ockerman, 2000).  Although the experimental efforts are focused on
aviation procedures, the results have implications for other safety critical socio-technical
systems (such as healthcare, manufacturing, nuclear power, and spacecraft operations).
The importance of this problem is reflected in the observation that the control of
most systems in safety critical environments is highly proceduralized.  There has been a
recognition in some fields (including aviation) of the extent to which procedures impact
the work domain.  Engineers who design flight deck instrumentation consider procedures
when developing new avionics.  However, such concern is uncommon, and there has
been little human factors work on the design and utilization of the procedures themselves
until recently (Degani & Weiner, 1994).
Procedures, despite their importance and ubiquity, are typically developed
informally, pieced together from diverse requirements and constraints on the system.  The
result is that the design philosophy behind a procedure, if there is one, is variable from
instance to instance. Procedures are also frequently under-defined and limited in scope.
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Information about the assumptions made when the procedure was designed is typically
lacking.  Operators must translate the requirements of the procedure into action and can
encounter situations that were not considered by those designing the procedure.  There is
often no training on when procedures do not apply (and what to do in those situations),
and almost no display support is provided to the operator for following or interpreting
procedures, or on how to proceed once a procedure has failed.
Yet operators are expected to follow procedure and are faulted if they deviate
from them, without considering whether the underlying procedure contributed to the
operator’s error, or even whether the procedure should have been followed at all.
Motivation
The research that resulted in this work began as an investigation into how to get
two aircraft-pilot systems to remain safely close to one another on approach to an airport
(Landry & Pritchett, 2000).  The dynamics of the aircraft-pilot systems, individually and
together, were not very difficult to determine.  Yet uncertainty about future position,
caused by system failures, errors by pilots, or reactions by pilots to unforeseen events,
went beyond the capability of automation.  Pilots, however, guided by good procedure,
could safely operate the system in these circumstances.  The operation of two aircraft
close to one another therefore needed to be governed more by procedure than by
dynamics or control.
Researchers had developed procedures for this situation (RTCA SC-186, 2002).
The proposed solutions, however, were generally dependent upon pilot execution of a
very specific procedure in a very specific manner (e.g. Teo and Tomlin, 2003).  After a
piloted experiment to test procedures for the task (described in Chapter 3) was
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accomplished, it became apparent that pilots were unlikely to blindly follow procedure,
nor did they have an expectation that the other pilot in the system would necessarily
adhere to procedure.  This lack of reliability has significant consequences for how the
system will need to be designed.
In light of these experiences, a review of the literature regarding procedures was
undertaken.  This review demonstrated that procedures were under-researched and poorly
understood in relation to their importance in human-machine systems.  Procedures are a
large contributor to accidents in a number of domains, including aviation (National
Transportation Safety Board, 1994b), the nuclear industry (Trager, 1988), and maritime
(Perrow, 1984).  Due to such statistics in aviation, there have been calls for more research
into procedures (National Transportation Safety Board, 1969).
One dramatic example of the importance of procedures is the Three Mile Island
nuclear facility incident in 1979.  The conclusion of the report of the President’s
Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island (1979) was that the accident was due
to human error caused by deficiencies in training for operating the plant under accident
conditions, confusing and misleading operating procedures, poor control room displays
for operating the plant during emergency situations, and a lack of training on previous
accidents.
In another example, pilots of a Gulf Air Airbus 320 crashed following a missed
approach to Bahrain International Airport due to non-adherence to operating procedure
(Aviation Safety Network, 2003).  The pilots performed an unauthorized maneuver to try
and shorten their subsequent approach, lost spatial orientation, and crashed.  Despite
departing from authorized procedures while doing the orbit at too low an altitude, the
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aircraft still would not have crashed had the operators adhered to the procedure for
reacting to the “ground proximity warning system” (GPWS), a system that detects unsafe
approach to terrain.  The system’s alarm went off 11 seconds prior to impact.  The pilots
responded to the alarm within 3 seconds by stating “gear’s up, flaps up” – an indication
that they thought the alarm went off due to an unsafe configuration rather than
approaching terrain.  The procedure for responding to the GPWS is an immediate climb
and does not include checking the configuration.
As a final example, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) indicated
that insufficient guidance concerning the recognition of when an approach was
unstabilized and a lack of indication that part of the pre-landing procedure was not
followed contributed to a fatal accident in Little Rock, AR (National Transportation
Safety Board, 2001).  Numerous other examples exist in the NTSB database.
Despite the prevalence of procedure-related accidents, only a handful of
researchers have focused on procedures.  Much of the research is focused on reasons for
noncompliance to, and ways to increase compliance with, procedures.  Most of the
remaining research has generally focused on how to present procedures to the operator.
The procedure itself is generally taken as correct, with any deviation from the procedure
considered an error.  When deviations from procedure exist where an accident has
occurred, the approach has been to assume that a better presentation of the procedure is
warranted.
This is certainly true in some cases.  However, noncompliance to procedure is not
unusual, and it does not always cause accidents.  In fact, noncompliance to procedures is
a necessary adaptation to uncertainty in the system – designers of procedures cannot
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foresee all the situations in which the procedures will operate, and in many situations
operators must deviate from procedures to maintain safety.  The extent to which this
occurs is difficult to determine, since reports are not generally written except in the case
of an accident.
Procedure designers almost exclusively design for nominal situations, where the
operator does not have to deal with unusual system configurations or task conditions.
When such unusual configurations or conditions exist (off-nominal situations), some
procedures may not be applicable and may in fact cause accidents if followed.
Depending on the criticality of the system, the procedure designer, and the designer of
any automated aid for procedure following, would be well-served to create a procedure
(or aid) that will provide useful support outside the nominal range of operation of the
procedure, or at least not be brittle in the way it fails under those circumstances.
The above concerns reflect the fact that very little theory on procedures has been
developed – what they are, how they are used, how they can be designed and supported.
Procedures are similar to automation or displays in that they are an aid to accomplishing
a task.  As such much of the research work that has gone into displays and automation
may apply to procedures.  Procedures, however, have their own unique features that need
to be explicitly considered.
Contribution
This dissertation will contain the beginnings of a theory of procedures – what they
are, how they fit into the human-machine system, and how they can be designed and
supported.  There is currently very little generalizable theory about procedures in the
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literature.  For the most part procedures are taken as is, with shortcomings of procedures
and aids addressed for specific applications and for specific problems.
The theory will view procedures as coupling between human and system which
arises in the presence of a goal, and which may indicate a safe or efficient method of
arriving at the goal.  Procedures also provide standardization and predictability in the
execution of a task.  Traditionally procedures have been viewed simply as the definition
of specific interactions with the systems; shortcomings were addressed by attempting to
better define these interactions.  As such, the interaction of the operator with the
procedure, and the procedure with the system, are both similar to the interaction of the
operator with an interface or with automation.  The research advances made in
understanding human-interface and human-automation interactions can then be applied to
procedures.  An example of this is the use of cognitive walkthrough for evaluating
procedures, which mirrors the same technique used for interface evaluation (Novick,
1999).
However, this dissertation will take a larger view of procedures, where procedures
also structure the input-output mapping of the system.  In this context, the role of the task
environment takes on more significance.  This environment, considered in the creation of
the procedure, is often not provided to the operator implementing the procedure.  This is
complicated by the ad hoc manner in which some procedures are developed.  Some
situations in which the operator could find him- or herself have been considered by the
procedure designer, but some have not.  Without this knowledge, the operator is in a poor
position to determine whether the procedure is still valid or not.
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Ockerman has described this as “procedure context”, which will be discussed in
detail in Chapter 3.  Procedure context provides a framework for conveying this missing
information to users.  Ockerman applied procedure context to the design of aviation
checklists; this dissertation will extend procedure context beyond that application.
As will be discussed in Chapter 3, many of the research efforts on procedure have
dealt with static procedures and checklists, and in situations in which compliance is
desired.  This dissertation is novel in that it examines how procedure information is used
in operational procedures (a dynamic task), and in situations in which intentional
noncompliance is desired.  This is the first research effort that studies whether
noncompliance to procedure may be a necessary adaptation to a system that has exceeded
the conditions envisioned by the procedure designer, and whether knowledge of the
context of the procedure can assist the operator in such situations.
An additional under-appreciated aspect of procedures is that they not only direct
action, but can also provide information.  In aviation, procedures provide standardization
across the numerous vehicles in the system.  They provide predictability about the future
state of the system – predictability that can be critically important to air traffic controllers
and pilots.  For example, position reporting is a common procedural requirement whereby
a pilot must announce over the radio his or her position at designated times.  In doing so,
the pilot not only provides an update on the position of her or his airplane, but the future
position of that airplane can be determined from knowledge of the procedure that pilot is
following.  Controllers and other aircraft can then safely determine what actions they can
take.  This dissertation is one of the first efforts to acknowledge and attempt to
understand that aspect of procedures.
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As mentioned above, this dissertation has implications beyond aviation.  As
discussed previously (and revisited in Chapter 3), most safety critical cooperative systems
utilize procedures and can benefit from a better understanding of how operators in these
systems comprehend the context of their procedures.
Organization
Chapter 2 discusses procedures in detail, including a discussion of aviation
procedures.  Although procedures, both formal and informal, govern nearly all of our
interaction with automated and assistive systems, there has been little done to clarify the
nature of procedures.  Checklists and instructions, as the visible representation of
procedures, have garnered the majority of what attention has been paid to the subject.
Only through a thorough understanding of the procedures themselves, and the relation
between the operator, the procedure, and the system, can a good understanding of how to
support procedure following be developed.
Chapter 3 surveys previous, supporting work.   Included is a discussion of
procedure context, which in this dissertation is applied to the problem of supporting
procedure following.  A discussion of a body of research on aviation checklists and
procedures is also treated in this chapter.  Since the experiments described in later
chapters include electronic displays, a description of relevant work on such displays is
also included.  Supporting work regarding the measures used in this dissertation is
covered as well.  Finally, a previous experiment which provides support for this
dissertation is also discussed.
Chapter 4 will detail the theory behind the design of the displays used in the
simulator flight experiment described in Chapter 5.  The concept of procedure context is
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applied to instrument approach procedures to generate information displays, which are
tested in a piloted simulation experiment.
The results of the flight experiment are discussed in Chapter 6, where the use of
enhanced displays which incorporate procedure context elements will be shown to
improve situation awareness and safety without increasing workload.  A discussion of
those results in provided in Chapter 7, with conclusions and recommendations for future




In considering procedures, one often thinks of checklists (or instructions).
However, checklists are not the actual procedure; rather, they are an aid designed to
provide support to the person executing the procedure.  The procedure is the set of steps,
acts, or even sub-procedures that one intends to accomplish in order to achieve a goal.
In the context of the aviation tasks discussed in detail in this dissertation,
procedures are used to manage the operation of an aircraft within the national airspace
system.  In general, however, procedures are used to manage the interaction of a system
or systems (e.g. a human operator, a vehicle, a control system) with another system or
systems (e.g. automation, roadways, a plant) in situations in which the interacting
systems are not deterministically connected.  In such situations, the range of interactions
between the systems is delimited by procedures.  Typical reasons for controlling the
interaction between systems are to ensure safety, efficiency, standardization, or
predictability.
Procedures as Coupling between System and Operator
Because a procedure can be viewed as a filter through which an operator and a
system interact, it is instructive to review for a moment the ways in which systems
couple, and the ways in which people couple with systems (Sheridan, 2002).  Mechanical
systems are nearly always coupled deterministically; that is, the mapping between input
and output is governed by physical laws.  If one displaces a mass in a mass-spring-
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dashpot system, the motion of the mass is predictable (to the accuracy of the
measurements).
As systems become more complex, they become no less deterministic, although it
may appear so.  Pressing the brake pedal on your car yields a predictable set of responses,
including the brake lights illuminating and the car slowing.  Obviously, this is not always
the response.  If there is some failure in part of the system, there may be a failure to
achieve the desired result.  However, this is not a loss of determinism, since the brake
system will always respond the same way under the same conditions of environment and
system function.  Rather, the extent to which pressing the brake pedal always makes the
brake light illuminate and the car slow is a measure of the system’s reliability, and the
reliability is a function of the variability of the environment and the operation (or lack
thereof) of the system components.  If one knows the status of the environment and
components, one can make an exact determination of the input-output mapping.
However, human behavior is not deterministic.  At least to the state of our science
of human behavior, even if one knows the status of environment and of the functioning of
the human, a given input will not yield a predictable output.  This lack of determinism is
carried over in the human-machine system.
In some cases, an operator’s response to an input, or that of the human-machine
system as a whole, can be predicted to some degree.  Such is the case with human
operation within a simple feedback control system, whose response is predicted by the
McRuer crossover model  (McRuer & Graham, 1965).  Such laws, however, are limited in
application.  Once the system with which the human operator is interacting becomes even
modestly complex, the system’s behavior will not be predictable by a simple control law.
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Consider even a relatively simple machine with which humans interact, such as a
microwave oven.  With no goal, the number of options available to the operator is equal
to the number of distinct inputs that the operator can perform.  A cursory examination of
my microwave suggests that this is typically a very large number, even for a simple
system.  Moreover, this number is an objective characteristic of the system.  It does not
decrease when a goal is established (e.g. “make popcorn”).  However, in identifying a
goal, it now becomes possible to identify a set of interactions with the machine that will
result in the goal being accomplished.  Note that it may be possible for there to be many
sets of interactions that accomplish the goal; a procedure identifies one of those sets.  A
set of instructions can then be written so that the user can accomplish the procedure.
In this way the procedure acts as the coupling between the human and system.  It
defines the interactions the operator has with the system based on the desired goal.
However, the coupling exists at two different levels.  At one level is the delineation of the
interactions with the system.  At another level is the interaction of the human-machine
system with its environment.  The procedure defines the steps an operator must take to
make popcorn in the microwave, but in a larger sense it defines how the microwave is to
act.
In a simple system, such as the microwave example, there is little variation in how
the microwave is to act across the range of possible popcorn-making procedures.  In a
complex, dynamic, multi-agent system, such as aviation, there is a large amount of
variation in how the system acts across the range of possible procedures.  The number of
ways an aircraft can get a point in enroute airspace to the threshold of a runway is large,
and what occurs in between that enroute point and the threshold has significant
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consequences for the aircraft, the pilot, the passengers, the air traffic controller, and other
aircraft.
Determinism of Procedures and Checklists
It is often stated or assumed in the literature that the procedure-goal mapping is
deterministic.  If the procedure is accomplished, then the goal will be accomplished
safely and efficiently.  The focus is then fixed upon the checklist, with the implicit
assumption that proper execution of a properly designed checklist will then be
deterministically mapped to the goal.  There is, however, a mistake with this assumption:
only knowledge of the environment and functioning of the system components ensures
predictability of the system’s input-output mapping.
Recall that the coupling between the machine and environment, while
deterministic, is not necessarily reliable.  For some systems, it is possible to check the
state of the system and environment and therefore predict the mapping of output from
input.  For many systems, however, the uncertainties in the system and the environment
are such that the system is not entirely predictable, and a given input cannot be assured to
have a given output.
In a simple system and with a simple goal, we can usually check the state of the
environment and system to the degree necessary.  If the procedure to make popcorn
consisted of one step – “push the popcorn button”, and we knew that the microwave
worked and was plugged in to a live electrical outlet, we could be very sure that our goal
would be reached when we pushed the popcorn button.  However, in a complicated
system, or in one in which the consequences for failure are dire, the procedure may need
to implicitly ensure that the environmental and system requirements on the input-output
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mapping are met.  Anyone who has ever jump-started a car (and even those who don’t
dare try) knows that it is important to ensure that the proper conditions are met before
implementing the procedure.
If the proper conditions are not met (i.e. the system is in an off-nominal state), and
if these conditions have not been addressed in the procedure, then the interactions with
the system may need to be different than those specified by the procedure.  However,
while the specific interactions may have changed, and if the underlying goal has not
changed as a result of the new conditions, then the procedure per se may still be valid in
many respects.  Procedure context, described in Chapter 3, provides a systematic way of
identifying the information needed by the operator to make these determinations.
Procedures in Aviation
The experiments that will provide support for the dissertation utilize aviation
tasks.  Both pilots and air traffic controllers use procedures for most tasks, due to the
safety critical and highly cooperative nature of the operation of aircraft in the National
Airspace System.  Pilots utilize checklists during each phase of flight as an aid to
accomplishing all normal and emergency procedures.  Air traffic procedures dictate roles
and responsibilities of controllers and pilots, govern how pilots traverse various types of
airspace, and dictate the transitions between phases of flight.
Of particular interest to the dissertation experiment discussed in Chapter 6 are
procedures encountered at one of the most critical phases of flight – arrival into the
terminal area and the subsequent final approach to the runway.  In good weather, pilots
can operate under Visual Flight Rules (VFR), a set of procedures designed to keep
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aircraft safe when they can easily see one another.  In bad weather or in busy airspace,
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) must be followed.
IFR procedures are described in the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs).  The
rules that govern general operating procedures are contained in FAR Part 91, while
procedures for approaching airports under IFR are contained in Part 97.  FAR Part 91
indicates that although all persons flying aircraft within the United States must follow the
regulations, the pilot in command is the ultimate authority of the aircraft and can deviate
from the rules if safety dictates (Federal Aviation Administration, 1994a).
Instrument Approach Procedures (IAPs)
Pilots flying under IFR and approaching an airport are required to fly an
instrument approach procedure (IAP).  These approach procedures are designed to
transition a pilot from enroute airspace to the runway environment.  Many approach
procedures are designed so that even a minimally equipped aircraft could fly the
approach.
The details for a particular approach are contained in an instrument approach
plate, which identifies the navigation aid to be used, the runway to which the IAP is
directed, the course to be captured and flown, and a descent profile.  An example is
shown in Figure 1.
In non-radar environments (or when told to by the air traffic controller), pilots
must fly an IAP that takes them from any altitude and transitions them to the final
approach.  This procedure is designed to keep all aircraft flying approaches to the airport
(and departures from the airport) separated, to keep the aircraft away from terrain
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obstructions, and safely and consistently turn the aircraft on to a stabilized final at an












Figure 1.  Instrument approach plate (Federal Aviation Administration, 2003).
To fly an IAP, pilots first cross the initial approach fix (IAF), then fly some track
in order to lose altitude.  Once crossing the final approach fix (FAF), pilots descend to the
minimum descent altitude (MDA) (or decision height if glidepath guidance is available).
Once reaching the MDA, pilots fly inbound until the runway environment is sighted or
until the missed approach point (MAP), which is typically identified by either timing or
by reaching a specified distance from a radio navigation aid.  If the MAP is reached and a
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safe landing cannot be made, the pilot must “go around” – initiate a missed approach
using the procedure specified on the approach plate.
There are several types of IAPs, but there are many common elements on the
approach plate.  Referencing the callouts in Figure 1, the elements found on all approach
plates are:
• approach information, such as the identifier and frequency of the initial approach
fix (IAF), the approach course, and runway information, are given in the upper
left corner;
• missed approach instructions are given in the upper right corner;
• at the bottom left is a minimums table indicating the MDA and minimum weather
requirements;
• a timing table, indicating how long it will take to get from the final approach fix
(FAF) to the missed approach point (MAP) is shown in the lower right;
• the name and runway of the approach are found below the timing table and above
the missed approach instructions;
• an airport diagram, including the elevation, is given above the timing table;
• in the center of the approach plate is a planview display of the approach,
including a symbolic depiction of the approach, an indication of the IAF,
indications of significant obstacles (which may be terrain or manmade), a circle
around the IAF of a certain distance (in this case it is 10 nautical miles), and an
indication of the minimum safe altitude (MSA – the altitude which provides 1,000
foot separation from the terrain within 25 nautical miles).
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For the particular approach shown in Figure 1, the following is the information
given on the approach plate:
• the IAF is the RNB non-directional beacon (NDB), its frequency is 363 KHz, the
approach course inbound is 147º, the runway is 5,057 feet long, the touchdown
zone elevation (TDZE) is 82 feet, and the elevation of the airport above sea level
is 86 feet;
• the missed approach procedure is to turn right, climb to 2000 feet, and proceed to
the RNB NDB and hold;
• for a straight in approach to runway 14 (S-14), the MDA for category A aircraft
(each subsequent letter indicates a higher approach speed, category A is typically
for small general aviation aircraft such as a Cessna 182) is 520 feet, the weather
must be at or above a 500 foot ceiling and 1 mile visibility, and when at the MDA
of 520 feet, the aircraft is 438 feet above the TDZE;
• at an approach groundspeed of 120 knots, it will take 1 minute 53 seconds to get
to the MAP;
• this approach is the NDB or GPS approach (this indicates that either an NDB or a
GPS is required to fly the approach) to runway 14 at Millville Muni airport (FAA
identifier MIV);
• the airport diagram shows (among other things) that this airport as two runways,
and that this approach is designed to land on runway 14;
• the planview display shows that this is a procedure turn (indicated by the “barb”
on the depiction of the inbound course), shows the relative position of the IAF
Rainbow (RNB), shows several obstacles to the left of the inbound approach
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course, shows a 10 mile radius circle around RNB, and indicates that the MSA is
2,100 feet.
Procedure Turn IAP
The procedure turn IAP has several segments.  The approach plate has all the
common elements of any instrument approach plate (discussed earlier).  There are two
additional elements: the “barb” and the “remain within” distance.  The barb indicates the
side of the inbound course on which the course reversal maneuver is to be performed.
The “remain within” distance indicates the extent within which the course reversal must
be accomplished.
These elements, in conjunction with the altitude restrictions provided on the
approach plate, are chosen such that an aircraft complying with those restrictions will be
more than 1,000 feet above any terrain feature until after the FAF.
The FARs state only that the procedure turn depiction must show “the outbound
course, direction of turn, distance within which the turn must be completed, and
minimum altitude (Federal Aviation Administration, 1994b, section 97.3).”  This means
that, for a procedure turn depicted with a barb, the point at which the turn inbound is
made, and the type and rate of the turn, is at the pilot’s discretion.  Typical maneuvers
taught (and commonly used) are the 45º-180º maneuver, the racetrack pattern, the tear-
drop, or the 80º-260º maneuver.  These maneuvers are shown in Figures 2a through 2d.
The headings indicated on the approach plate correspond to the 45º maneuver, but this
maneuver is not required.  Some depictions of a procedure turn indicate a particular










Figure 2.  Entry maneuvers for procedure turn IAP.
The 45º-180º  maneuver consists of a turn to the inbound course outbound for
approximately 45 seconds to one minute, then a 45º turn towards the protected side
(remaining on that heading for approximately 1 minute), then a 180º turn in the opposite
direction as the last turn.  This 180º heading should give the aircraft a 45º intercept
heading to the inbound course.  The aircraft then intercepts and follows the inbound
course (and the remainder of the procedure).
The racetrack pattern is a technique typically used when the aircraft is already
flying close to the inbound course to the procedure turn fix.  In this case it would take a
180º turn to start a 45º maneuver, and the aircraft would be well off of the inbound course
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outbound by the time such a turn is completed.  Instead, the aircraft simply turns 180º
towards the protected side and flies that course outbound for one to one and a half
minutes.  The aircraft then turns 180º again (in the same direction), which should put the
aircraft back on the inbound course.
The tear-drop maneuver consists of turning immediately to the 45º heading
depicted on the approach plate once passing over the procedure turn fix, and flying that
heading for one to one and a half minutes, then turning 135º back towards the inbound
course.  These turns should result in the aircraft being close to on course inbound.
The 80º-260º maneuver is similar to the 45º maneuver except that the 80º heading
is not maintained.  Once the heading is obtained, the turn back towards the inbound
course is commenced.  This maneuver should result in the aircraft being close to on
course inbound.
The “remain within” distance must be complied with for terrain avoidance
reasons.  Outside this region 1,000 foot obstacle clearance is not guaranteed if the aircraft
is below the MDA.  The standard maneuvers described above have been shown to remain
within 10 miles.  If the pilot uses any other maneuvers or if the “remain within” distance
is 5 miles, then some planning is required, and typically different times for when to turn





Due to the safety critical nature of aviation, the environment is highly
proceduralized, as can be found in other safety critical domains (such as nuclear power).
Yet the design of checklists and procedures for aviation has not been directly investigated
until recently (Degani & Weiner, 1994), and to this day is not the subject of a great deal
of research effort.  The reason is probably best reflected in a response early investigators
got to their inquires – “checklists, they are simple and straightforward, so what is there to
study about them (Degani & Weiner, 1990, p. 2)?”
Although several aviation accidents related to procedures occurred earlier, the
first real research interest in procedures came about outside of the aviation industry.  On
March 28, 1979, a minor malfunction at the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear facility
spiraled dangerously out of control due in large part to poor interface and procedure
design.  The malfunction was not responsible for the severity of the accident – the
resulting actions by the well-trained operators were.  A nuclear power plant is extremely
complex, and the operation of the plant, controlled through procedures, displays, and
automation, is quite distal from its functioning.  For this reason, those operating
procedures, displays, and automation are critical to the plant’s functioning.  The TMI
accident demonstrated that in a system of critical safety and high complexity, the value of
good procedures and good displays can outweigh good technical knowledge of the
underlying functioning of a system, if that knowledge goes unsupported.
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As a result of this accident, a flurry of research activity regarding displays and
procedures for nuclear (and similar) plants commenced.  This research, and the attention
the subject received, did not stem the tide of procedural failings, however.  Several
groups of investigators found that failures with procedures remained the cause of the
majority of human-factors related accidents (Marsden, 1996).
The first direct research on aviation checklists and procedures was motivated by a
string of accidents related to checklists.  In 1969 a Pan American World Airways Boeing
707 attempted a takeoff without having deployed flaps and crashed, prompting the safety
board to call for a review of cockpit checklists (National Transportation Safety Board,
1969).  That recommendation was not heeded.  The following decades witnessed
numerous accidents with checklist or procedural factors involved in the accident
description.  The ways in which checklists can contribute to accidents are numerous, and
not always listed as an official causative or contributory factor.  NTSB reports frequently
mention some inadequacy regarding procedures or procedure-following.  Following is a
list of quotations from the NTSB online database (National Transportation Safety Board,
2004) that demonstrate the range of checklist problems (abbreviations replaced with
words in parentheses):
• “ … the (flight crew) failed to follow procedural checklist requirements &
to detect & correct a mistrimmed stabilizer before the (aircraft) became
uncontrollable … (National Transportation Safety Board, 1983a)”
• “ … the (captain) became disorientated (sic) and inadvertently reentered
(runway) 25R … A DC-10 had already begun its takeoff roll (and) rotated
and began its climb … (crossing) over … (Flight) 1605 about 200 (feet)
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A.G.L.  The first officer (reported) that while the (captain) was taxiing …
he was busy completing the After (Landing) Checklist. (National
Transportation Safety Board, 1988a)”
• “FAA approved procedural checklist had omitted (a) critical step in (the)
manual gear extension procedure. (National Transportation Safety Board,
1988b)”
• “A second (alternate) gear extension procedure … is not published in the
crew manuals, taught during initial training, or available on any checklist.
(National Transportation Safety Board, 1990)”
• “Numerous genuine and ‘phantom’ TCAS traffic alerts were received
during the approach, which distracted (the crew) from their checklist.
(National Transportation Safety Board, 1994a)”
•  “The evidence indicated that the flaps and slats were in the up/retract
position and had not been deployed for (takeoff).  Neither (pilot) recited
the items of the taxi (checklist). (National Transportation Safety Board,
1987a)”
• “The crew failed to assure that the RPM levers were full forward in the
takeoff (100 percent) position … Both crew members had relatively little
(flight) experience in the BAE-3101 which differs in RPM control lever
procedures from other (aircraft) … (National Transportation Safety Board,
1987b)”
•  “… the (flight crew attempted) to takeoff without the wing flaps and slats
properly configured for takeoff … Contributing to the accident was
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Delta’s slow implementation of necessary modifications to its operating
procedures, manual’s (sic), checklists … (National Transportation Safety
Board, 1988c)“
• “The rudder trim position was found to be 16 (degrees), or full, left
deflection of rudder.  The (flight data recorder) recorded this position from
engine start at the gate. (National Transportation Safety Board 1989)”
The last four quotations were taken from accidents in which there were a total of 172
fatalities, 33 serious injuries, 83 minor injuries, and 58 uninjured, and they happened over
the course of 28 months - from May 1987 to September 1989.  It was, more than any
other incidents, these that caused the focus on aircraft procedures and checklists.  There
was, at the time, almost no research on how checklists should be designed (Degani &
Weiner, 1990) with the notable exception of several studies examining the use of
electronic checklists (Rouse & Rouse, 1980) (Rouse, Rouse, & Hammer, 1982).
The initial concentration of effort was on the paper checklists itself, evaluated as a
display aid.  However, it became apparent that the problems were much more complex.
Procedures and checklists are part of the “operating concept” (Degani & Weiner, 1994)
of the system, and are crucial to its successful and safe operation.  Among the issues
analyzed over the past decade concerning procedures are: general limitations/deficiencies
of paper checklists, social and organizational issues, interruptions and distractions,




The paper checklist was designed to be a memory aid to ensure that certain parts
of critical procedures were accomplished.  There are plenty of examples of incomplete,
inaccurate, poorly organized, and poorly written checklists.  In addition, however, are
(Gross, 1995):
• Checklists can be hard to locate or hard to access.
• Checklists may branch, creating a navigation problem.
• Checklists can be different or even disagree with flight manuals and
training.
• Checklists vary significantly between equipment and company.
• Emergency checklists are often organized very differently by different
organizations.
• Checklists are sometimes unclear or contain “training-type” information.
This is but one group of classifications.  There are others, but they can be categorized as
having to do with either design of the procedure or implementation of the procedure.
Social and organizational issues
Procedures are not self-contained entities.  They exist in context, and part of that
context is the individuals who interact with the procedures, and the organizations that
create and implement the procedures.  Issues of philosophy, policy, implementation, and
attitudes all affect the utility of procedures.
Most organizations working with high-risk systems have a strong belief in
procedures.  The aviation and nuclear industries are two prime examples.  Both create
standard operating procedures that cover a substantial portion of normal operations, and
nearly all emergency operations.  These operating procedures often reflect the philosophy
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of the organization (or at least what is currently emphasized in the organization).  As
much as possible, it is suggested that the design of procedures reflect this philosophy and
the policies of the organization that flow from that philosophy (Degani & Weiner, 1994).
Of course, different philosophies and policies lead to different procedures.
Checklists for the same aircraft often differ substantially between companies (Degani &
Weiner, 1994).  This is true across equipment as well as across companies.  The result is
that even within a company, procedures will differ as pilots transition across different
airframes.
This is also true in many other, more mobile, settings.  There are procedures in
most work settings, and associated with many pieces of equipment, including consumer
electronics (and in putting together new furniture or toys).  These procedures will vary
significantly across similar applications, creating difficulty and in some cases error.
In multi-person systems, procedures are adapted by different members of the
organization.  Members utilize procedures in the context of their work, and adapt them
based on their own experience and skill (Hughes, 1992).
Operators also adapt procedures due to the uncertainty present in the environment.
An example of this is a case of deliberate nonconformance to procedure:
Descending (through) 15000 (feet) into Nassaue the #2 (engine) was shut
down due to low oil (pressure) at 16000 (feet).  Returning to Miami the #3
(engine) flamed out, (and) 3 (minutes) later the #1 (engine) flamed out.  The
(aircraft) began descending without power from 13000 (feet).  At about 10000
(feet) the flightcrew announced that ditching was imminent. The #2 engine
was restarted … and the (aircraft) made a (one-engine) landing at Miami.  All
o-ring seals in the master chip detector (assemblies) in the (engine) lubrication
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system were missing causing oil leaks in all (engines).  Proper procedures to
remove, reinstall, and inspect the detectors for oil leaks were available.  The
foreman knew that mechanics were not routinely replacing o-ring seals.
Accident was 9th chip detector occurrence since procedures were revised
12/81. (National Transportation Safety Board, 1983b)
Several issues were at play in this near-accident.  New procedures had recently been
developed, and mechanics were apparently unable to follow them.  The pilots disregarded
procedures by not shutting down engines with low oil pressure lights on (the two engines
that later flamed out - #3 and #1), because they believed that the chances of three engines
having low oil pressure simultaneously was “one in millions I would think” (Norman,
1988).  This calculation was based on, in part, the assumption that every one else had
followed procedures.  Yet their actions in violating procedures were correct in the sense
that the procedure would not have helped them.  The L-1011 cannot operate (well)
without engines, and they would, at some point, have been required to create their own
procedure for dealing with something that went well beyond the scope of what
procedures they had.
The previous example points to a pervasive feature of the proceduralization of the
work environment.  The basic framework of procedures provides a great deal of
information about the actions of others.  They provide general predictive information
about the environment (including other operators, vehicles, etc.), and without this
information, operators can only react to events as they occur with no foresight (Pritchett
& Yankosky, 2000).
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As a result of these variations, some procedure guidelines for airlines were
developed, relating to (amongst other things) social and organizational issues (Degani &
Weiner, 1994):
• A feedback loop from line pilots to flight management and procedure
designers should be established.  This feedback loop should be a formal
process.  It must be maintained as a non-punitive, reactive system, with
mandatory feedback from management to the initiating line pilot about the
progress of his or her report and/or suggestion.
• It is essential that management develop a philosophy of its operations.
This is particularly important for operating automated cockpits.
• Management, through the use of the feedback loop and the line check
airman program, should be watchful of techniques that are used on the
line.  Techniques that conform to procedures and policies should not be
interfered with.  Techniques that have a potential for policy and procedure
deviation should be addressed through the normal quality assurance
processes.  Techniques that yield better and safer ways of doing a task
may be considered for SOP.
Interruptions and distractions
A frequent problem with procedures and checklists is distractions, both from the
procedure and by the procedure.  The Aviation Survey Reporting System (ASRS) is
replete with examples of flight crew being distracted from a procedure, resulting in
skipped steps or worse (Monan, 1979).  In other cases, the checklist or procedure itself is
a distraction.  These instances are not entirely a problem with the procedure or checklist,
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however, but relate more to the general workload, poor planning, or unfortunate timing of
events.
One method of avoiding missed steps due to interruptions is the use of some type
of “placeholder”.  This may be in the form of verbalization (Linde & Goguen, 1987), or
some type of pointer such as in scroll checklists (Degani & Weiner, 1990).  These
methods are infrequently used, however, and scroll checklists are generally not used for
in-flight checklists.
Underreliance and overreliance
As mentioned previously, nonconformance to a procedure can be unintentional or
intentional.  The latter case is sometimes due to “underreliance” on the procedure.  This
term is frequently applied to automation (Kirlik, 1993) when the automation is regarded
as a more complicated means of accomplishing a task.  In this case, operators will often
not use the automation.  The same is true of procedures.  If the procedure is seen as
overly burdensome, unreliable, or unnecessarily complex, operators may not use, or may
find ways around, the procedure.
The opposite case, overreliance, also has an automation counterpart (Parasuraman
& Riley, 1997), where operators will use the automation even when it is malfunctioning
or its use is inappropriate.  Procedures in some ways may be more prone to this type of
failure.  Four ways in which overreliance can become a factor have been elicited by
researchers (Ockerman & Pritchett, 2000):
• The procedure may be accurate but its intention may be misinterpreted.
• The procedure may be accurate and its intention may be interpreted
properly, but it may be used outside its intended range of application.
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• The operator may use an inappropriate strategy in implementing the
procedure.
• Parts or all of the procedure may be wrong.
Overreliance can be mitigated in a number of ways, including using design
guidelines for procedures and procedure support such as those proposed in this
dissertation.  The operator should be thoroughly trained on the system and the
procedures, including an understanding of the assumptions of the designer.  A designer
may embed “additional” information that is not specifically part of the procedure, which
may include having some type of automated assistance in accomplishing the procedure.
In addition, the procedure can be designed to better situate the operator in the context of
the procedure.  Lastly, a rigorous design and testing process can hopefully eliminate
errors in the procedure.
Deliberate Noncompliance
Previous research efforts have viewed deliberate noncompliance as due to
individualism, complacency, frustration, technique, or even humor (Degani & Weiner,
1994).  While these are certainly true, they only represent an undesirable class of
noncompliance.  Yet despite the best intentions of procedure designers, operators can find
themselves in situations in which procedures are wrong or don’t exist at all.  In these
circumstances the operator may choose to violate procedure.
In doing so, the operators must create their own procedure, or modify an existing
one.  In July 1989 a United Airlines DC-10 had a failure which destroyed the #2 engine
and one of three hydraulic systems, and which subsequently severed the lines of the two
remaining hydraulic systems.  The control surfaces of the aircraft had no manual backup
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– they could only be controlled by hydraulics.  The loss of all three hydraulic systems had
been thought impossible by designers, and crews had never trained or heard of any
procedures to handle the aircraft in that situation.  Nonetheless, the aircrew was in that
situation and had to develop a procedure.  The pilot later recalled,
And as a result (of having no hydraulic systems), we had no ailerons to bank
the airplane, we had no rudder to turn it it, no elevators to control the pitch, we
had no leading-edge flaps or slats to slow the airplane down, no trailing-edge
flaps for landing, we had no spoilers on the wing, to help us get down, or help
us slow down, once we were on the ground.  And on the ground, we had no
steering, nose wheel or tail, and no brakes.  So what we had … was the
throttles on #1 and #3 engine to control us.  And by manipulating those
throttles, we were able to somewhat control the heading, by skidding the
airplane into a turn.  And controlling the pitch was just about out of the
question (Haynes, 1991).
The pilots created a procedure to control the aircraft without hydraulics and
performed a somewhat controlled crash landing in Sioux City, Iowa.  The pilots’ ability
to not rely on a predefined procedure saved the lives of over 180 people on this flight.
Automation for Procedures
Some previous efforts have been made to use automation to support procedure
following.  In a study designed to test automated procedure aiding in an industrial setting,
an automation tool that could control the system was modified to provide procedure
guidance to operators in an attempt to enhance performance.  Surprisingly, operators still
performed worse than the automation tool, and were found to use different courses of
action in dealing with plant operation.  It was found that the automation had been
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programmed with heuristics designed to maximize production, a goal that was not
reflected in the operational procedures (Knaueper & Morris, 1984).
Automation of checklists and procedures was initially seen as a way of guarding
against error, with the automation monitoring implementation of the procedure.
Additional benefits, such as providing a larger set of procedures or even automating
creation of procedures “on-the-fly” were also investigated (Hammer, 1984).  Some
evaluations of automating procedures have produced positive results (Rouse & Rouse,
1980), while others have produced mixed or even negative results (Rouse, Rouse, &
Hammer, 1982)(Converse, 1994).  In addition, one study found that pilots may have
overreliance problems on automated checklists (Palmer & Degani, 1991).
In each of these cases, the aids were designed to assist in essentially following
checklists, and assumed universal compliance.  The aids assisted operators in following
the steps of the procedure, but did not consider the overall context of the procedure.
Electronic Flight Bag
A recent development has been the introduction of “electronic flight bags”
(EFBs), which are essentially a laptop or other small portable computer that replaces all
of the paper charts that pilots normally carry with them.  Although not approved as a
replacement for paper charts by the FAA, some aircraft have these installed and they are
being used in addition to paper charts.  EFBs have the potential to not only replace paper
charts and operating manuals, but also could be used as electronic checklists, could
receive real-time weather, and could even interact with flight systems (Shamo, Dror, &
Degani, 1998).  Since the definition of standards for these devices have only just been
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As more complex automation is added to flight decks and air traffic facilities, and
as more information is provided to operators, accessing and comprehending that
automation and information becomes problematic.  Researchers have begun to
understand that not only do they need to know how to display information, but also how
operators represent and utilize that information, in order to provide a better match
between technology and the human (Endsley, 2000).
Situation awareness (SA) has been a particularly important concept in aviation,
since safe and successful operation in aviation requires a great deal of knowledge about
the environment outside of an individual aircraft (Harwood, Barnett, & Wickens, 1988).
Many aviation accidents can be attributed to a lack of knowledge of the environment
external to the aircraft (collisions with aircraft and the ground, for example)  (Bolman,
1979).  For air traffic controllers, their knowledge of the “big picture” includes not only
the states of the aircraft in their own sector, but those of neighboring sectors, airports,
weather, and much more.  Attempts to understand how pilots and controllers obtain and
maintain this “big picture” have been the focus of SA research.
Military aviators, since as far back as the first World War, have understood the
importance of SA, and instructed their pilots in developing and maintaining good SA.
One of Germany’s top World War I’s fighter aces, Oswald Boelcke, listed among his
“dicta” that “the pilot must acquire the habit of ‘taking in’ unconsciously the general
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progress of the whole mult-aircraft dogfight going on around the individual combat in
which the pilot will become involved … (so that) no time (is) wasted in assessment of the
general situation after the end of an individual combat (Hacker, 1984, section IV, number
6).”  Boelcke also prescribes knowledge of one’s own machine, the enemy’s machine,
and navigational fixes.  SA has been a significant aeronautical training topic since that
time.
As a research topic, however, the concept was mostly ignored by researchers until
the 1980s.  Due to increasing flight deck and air traffic automation, pilots’ and air traffic
controllers’ role as supervisor of these systems was increasing, reducing the time they
could spend in developing SA.  At the same time a great deal of new sensor information
was becoming available to designers of aviation automation, information that could be
used to reinforce the controllers’ and pilots’ SA.  Researchers began looking into what
SA is, what affects an operator’s ability to construct SA and to keep it, and how it might
be measured.
Situation awareness research
Many definitions of SA exist, with most agreeing that SA is, at least in part, the
comprehension of elements of the environment that have (or may have) some bearing on
the task being accomplished.
Several efforts at defining SA have been put forth.  Some efforts have viewed SA
as a static, information-driven product, some have viewed it as a dynamic process, while
others have viewed SA as a high-level description of certain aspects of task behavior.
One of the most widely quoted definitions of SA is: “ … the perception of elements in the
environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and
36
the projection of their status in the near future (Endsley, 1999, p. 258).”  Another
researcher has called SA “… an integrated understanding of factors that will contribute to
the safe flying of the aircraft under normal or non-normal conditions (Regal, Rogers, &
Boucek, 1989, p. 65),”  These definitions describe SA as a product, something that an
operator either has or does not have.  Typically these authors, although acknowledging its
importance, defer the production of SA as a separate topic of inquiry.  The argument is
that SA-related errors are caused by the lack of SA, which is then only in turn affected by
the lack of production of SA.  So comprehending the SA product can help us understand
why errors were made, whereas understanding the process can only help us understand
why SA is lacking.
SA has also been described as a process, such as in referring to SA as “(an)
adaptive, externally-directed consciousness” (Smith & Hancock, 1995, p. 137), and “the
integration of knowledge resulting from recurrent situation assessments (Sarter & Woods,
1991, p. 45).”  Some researchers, as mentioned above, consider the process of obtaining
SA separate from the product, and refer to this process using this term – “situation
assessment”.  The process-based SA research has mostly gone towards understanding
how SA is obtained and maintained.
Some researchers have called into question the utility of the SA concept.  Many
feel it is a high-level concept that does not have sufficient granularity to really explain
anything.  SA has been referred to as simply a description of observations of humans
operating complex systems within a dynamic environment (Billings, 1995) and as simply
equivalent to expertise (Crane, 1992).  As such, SA is a description of a set of cognitive
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processes that are used together, and is really only useful in categorizing or grouping
behaviors and errors.
Researchers have also examined how SA is obtained and maintained.  Here the
sources of the information (visual, auditory, tactile, other sensory input, knowledge of
procedures and regulations, etc.) are diverse and often clearly identifiable.  The
operator’s ability to detect, comprehend, synthesize, and project this information is
generally of more interest to researchers.  It is interesting to note that these abilities begin
with the most fundamental cognitive processes (detection), and progress to very
sophisticated concepts (projection), and that they are typically studied separately, often
by different groups of researchers.
Detection of information involves the well-studied (if not well-understood)
processes of perception and attention.  Researchers have studied how these processes
influence SA, including how the limits of working memory affect SA, how long term
memory may be used in SA, and how task objectives influence attention.
Comprehension of information for use in SA has also been studied.  Several
researchers have examined how operators may use recognition or pattern-matching to
develop SA, although there is also evidence that this strategy is not sufficient to explain
all SA.  Expectations also influence the development of SA, both positively and
negatively.
Measuring SA
SA, as a set of knowledge, has been difficult to measure.  Typical measures can
be broken into three categories: explicit (or knowledge-based), implicit (or performance-
based), and subjective (Vidulich, 1992).  Examples of explicit methods include
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participants’ recall of a situation (post-hoc), an ongoing narrative provided concurrently
with the task, or freezing a scenario and questioning the participant about the decisions,
events, or the task environment.  These measures can be compared to actual state of the
system to provide a better measure, but have been criticized as too subjective (in the case
of recall) (Fracker, 1991), or too intrusive (in the case of freezing a scenario) (Sarter &
Woods, 1995).
Implicit measures examine task performance, and correlate that with SA.  These
measures are generally unobtrusive and objective, and (as mentioned earlier) can be used
in conjunction with explicit measures.  It has been suggested that these measures can
succeed where explicit methods cannot, particularly in situations where a determination
of the timing of events is important and where the subject may be unaware of his or her
deficiency (Pritchett, Hansman, &Johnson, 1995).  These measures may examine
performance at the task overall, or alter the task to determine whether the subject notices
the change.
Subjective ratings are assessments of SA made either by an observer or by the
subject.    These ratings can use a number of different scales, and can be either direct or
relative (such as by comparing SA in one situation to SA in another situation).  Although
these ratings can be affected by a number of factors, including task performance, one
technique that has been studied extensively is the Situation Awareness Rating Technique
(SART) (Taylor, 1989).  This technique has the operator rate 10 constructs on a seven
point scale.  The constructs are grouped into three categories: attentional demand (which
includes the instability, variability, and complexity of the situation), attentional supply
(including arousal, spare mental capacity, concentration, and division of attention), and
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understanding (which includes information quality and quantity, and familiarity).  SART
has been found to be more sensitive than overall subjective measures of SA (Selcon &
Taylor, 1989), although some researchers feel that SART confounds SA with workload
(Jones & Endsley, 2000).
NASA TLX
The NASA Task Load Index (TLX) workload rating system was adapted from an
earlier NASA Bipolar Rating Scale (Hart & Staveland, 1988).  There are six dimensions
to the NASA TLX, three related to the subject (mental, physical, and temporal) and three
to the interaction of the subject with the task (effort, frustration, and performance).  TLX
has been widely used in a variety of domains to measure workload.
TLX users rate the six dimensions on a 20 point scale, and perform a pairwise
comparison on those dimensions.  The pairwise comparisons are then used to weight the
user’s workload ratings.
Procedure Context
One method of mitigating over- and underreliance is through presenting
procedure context (Ockerman, 2000).  In an aircraft inspection task, overreliance on the
checklist was reduced when pilots were presented with procedure context information
(Ockerman & Pritchett, 1998).
As discussed by Ockerman (Ockerman, 2000), a great deal of information that
could be useful for understanding the underlying assumptions and constraints of a
particular procedure was considered by the developers of that procedure.  This “context”
of the procedure – its intentions, assumptions, ordinality, etc. is often lost once the
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procedure is implemented.  Knowledge of these elements gives pilots access to a great
deal of information about a procedure.
The context of a procedure provides the user with information that can enable him
or her to make informed judgments concerning implementation of steps in the procedure,
deviations or alterations to the procedures, and appropriate levels of reliance on the
procedure.  Procedure context consists of two categories – explanatory and locational,
and their elements.
Explanatory context provides background information on the procedure,
indicating purposes and interrelationships within the procedure.  It helps the user apply a
strategy to accomplish the procedure, and aid him or her in understanding consequences
of not complying with the procedure, or in enabling him or her to safely alter the
procedure during execution.  Normally much of this information is not transferred by the
procedure designers and is lost.  If retained, however, the information can be provided to
the user through training, documentation, or displays.  Elements of explanatory context
are:
• Intention – this reflects the overall goal state of the procedure.
• Rationale – this reflects the reasons for individual steps.
• Boundary conditions – this reflect the conditions under which the
procedure is assumed to be operating.
• Triggering conditions – this reflects external conditions that may cause a
procedure to begin, branch, or end.
• Temporal construct – this reflects the time window in which the procedure
is assumed (or is required) to be accomplished.
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• Ordinality – this reflects the requirements for the order in which steps
must be accomplished.
• Necessity – this reflects the degree of requirement that the step be
accomplished.
• Reversibility – this reflects the degree to which actions accomplished as
part of the procedure can be “taken back”.
• Appropriate specificity – this reflects the degree to which the procedure
captures the detail of what needs to be accomplished.
Locational procedure context is intended to provide information concerning the physical
ordering of the procedure.  Its elements are:
• Previous actions – this relates to the actions that have been already
accomplished.
• Following actions – this relates to the actions that are upcoming.
• Location indication – this relates to where in the global procedure the
current step resides.
• Forking – this relates to how a procedure might branch.
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Chapter 4
Preliminary Experiment Investigating Pilot Use of Procedure Information In A
Parallel Approach Task
This chapter describes a preliminary experiment which investigated pilot use of
procedure information during instrument approaches (Landry & Pritchett, 2002a; Landry
& Pritchett, 2002b).  In this experiment these roles of procedures were investigated by
examining pilot compliance during a closely spaced parallel approach procedure, their
reaction to another aircraft’s noncompliance to procedure, and their use of displays that
utilize procedural information.
The results of this experiment movitated the dissertation research by
demonstrating that:
• pilots used a heuristic strategy to conduct the procedure,
• compliance to procedure cannot be assumed,
• noncompliance to procedure may be a necessary adaptation to the task
environment, and
• pilots were unable to interpret the consequences of the other aircraft’s
noncompliance and will continue to use procedure information in
situations in which the procedure no longer applies.
Background
The proposed approach procedure, “paired approaches”, places two aircraft on
instrument approaches to closely spaced parallel runways, with one aircraft initially offset
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behind the other.  Currently such approaches are only allowed in visual conditions or
when closely monitored by an air traffic controller with a fast update radar and dedicated
display (the system is called the “precision runway monitor”).  This new instrument
procedure is being investigated to attempt to increase airport throughput during bad
weather and to runways closer than allowed with the precision runway monitor system.
The trail aircraft maintains a position relative to the lead aircraft (Stone, 1996;
Pritchett, 1999; Hammer, 1999).  Such a position (called the “safe zone”) guarantees that
neither aircraft will be in danger of loss of separation within a certain time window
should the other depart its approach path, and that neither aircraft will be affected by the
other’s wake.
Two different underlying bases can be used to determine the safe zone (Pritchett
& Landry, 2001). The first uses procedural information; i.e. the “predicted” safe zone is
calculated assuming that the aircraft are following the pre-specified approach procedure.
The predicted safe zone provides a spatial boundary which is small and unchanging
throughout the approach, but which is inaccurate if either aircraft is violating the
approach procedure.
The second basis for the safe zone uses real-time information; i.e. the “actual”
safe zone is based on the current states of both aircraft.  The actual safe zone is
continually updated, and presents a spatial boundary which is as large as possible for the
immediate context, but constantly changing in size and location.
This preliminary study examined the relative merits of the different underlying
conceptual bases of the safe zone, which imply different control strategies and suggests
different types of monitoring for unusual situations. In particular, since the predicted safe
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zone is not valid if either aircraft deviates from procedure, it was expected that pilots
would more closely monitor compliance when using the predicted safe zone.  In addition,
pilot conformance to procedure and reaction to the other aircraft’s nonconformance was
investigated.
Method
Participating pilots (12 male airline pilots current or previously qualified in glass
cockpit aircraft) were asked to fly approaches using Georgia Tech’s Reconfigurable
Flight Simulator (RFS) (Ippolito & Pritchett, 2000).  The RFS is a medium fidelity
simulator which ran on a Pentium III desktop computer.  The experiment setup is shown
in Figure 3.  One aircraft was simulated and flew a present approach, while a second
aircraft was flown by the participant pilot.  The participant pilot’s aircraft was
programmed with a dynamic model and cockpit systems representing a Boeing 747-400.
The instruments are shown in Figure 4.
Figure 3.  Experiment setup for preliminary experiment.
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Figure 4.  Instruments for preliminary experiment.
The navigation display (ND) included an overlay of traffic information about the
aircraft on the other approach and the safe zone presentations, which were displayed as
staple shaped brackets (Figure 5).  The inner (green) brackets in Figure 5 represented the
predicted safe zone, while the outer (yellow) brackets represented the actual safe zone.
Pilots were given detailed briefings on the simulator and the procedure, and given
an opportunity to practice with each until they felt comfortable. In their briefing on the
safe zone, it was stressed that a position within the actual safe zone was safe for the next
30 seconds from collision and wake turbulence regardless of the actions of either aircraft,
while a position within the predicted safe zone was similarly safe, but only if the two
aircraft were not deviating from the approach procedure.
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Figure 5. Navigation display for preliminary experiment showing both safe zones.
For either safe zone indication, if a safe zone limit was exceeded, the protection
provided was no longer guaranteed, and it was recommended that a missed approach be
executed. The missed approach procedures were provided on the approach plate, and
indicated both a climb and a turn away from the other approach path.
The participants were instructed to fly an instrument landing system approach,
while remaining within the safe zone. The participant pilots flew the trail aircraft, with
the lead aircraft being the scripted simulated aircraft. Each run began at approximately 20
miles from runway threshold on the localizer and at approximately 200 knots true air
speed (KTAS). The participants were instructed that ATC had told them (and the lead
aircraft) to maintain 180 KTAS, plus or minus 10 knots, until 5 miles from runway
threshold, where they could slow to their normal approach speed of 148 KTAS.
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Each participant pilot flew 10 data collection runs. The first nine runs represented
a two factor design with three safe zone displays and three blunder types. The three
displays refer to the conceptual basis of the safe zone, as follows:
• Predicted safe zone display: The predicted safe zone was shown on the
ND.
• Actual safe zone display: The actual safe zone was shown on the ND.
• Both safe zones display: Both safe zones were shown on the ND, allowing
the pilot to directly compare the two types of information. In this case the
pilots were briefed that they could exceed the predicted safe zone limits as
long as they remained within the actual safe zone limits.
The blunder type refers to the type of noncompliance committed by the lead
aircraft:
• No noncompliance: a baseline in which the lead aircraft complied with all
procedural restrictions.
• Speed noncompliance: The lead aircraft slowed substantially below the
approach procedure’s minimum allowed speed, as if this aircraft were
configuring and attaining final approach speed 5-10 miles before allowed
by approach procedures.
• Lateral noncompliance: The lead aircraft turned toward and crossed the
participant’s approach path, in the form of a turn to a new heading
commonly used as a blunder model.
Once the participant completed these nine runs, he (all participants were male)
flew a tenth run with one of the three safe zone displays in a combined deviation
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scenario: specifically, the lead aircraft first slowed below the minimum allowed
procedural speed, and then the lead aircraft also turned toward and crossed the trail
aircraft’s approach path.  The complete experiment matrix is shown in Table 1.
Table 1.  Experiment matrix for preliminary experiment.
 PROCEDURAL  REAL-TIME BOTH 
No noncompliance A B C 
Speed noncompliance D E F 
Lateral noncompliance G H I 
Both speed and lateral J1 J2 J3 
 
Display of Safe Zone 
In addition to observations of pilot behavior and comments, the following
quantitative measurements were taken:
• Pilot detection of non-procedural actions by the lead aircraft, and the
ability of the pilot to describe what the lead aircraft did;
• Approach stability as indicated by the variation about mean in the throttle
movements, elevator movements, and glideslope tracking
Results
The results of the participants’ detection of lead aircraft noncompliance is shown
in Figure 6.  Subjects failed to detect 4% of lead noncompliance, and mis-detected 18%















Figure 6.  Pilot detection of lead aircraft noncompliance.
The detection results were analyzed with respect to the independent variables, as
shown in Figure 7.  Kruskal-Wallis tests indicated no significant results with respect to
either independent variable.
The standard deviations of throttle movements, elevator movements, and
glideslope deviation, indicative of the stability of the approach, were also analyzed.  The
least-square means of the standard deviations with respect to the independent variables
are shown in Figure 8.   Elevator movement standard deviations were normally
distributed; glideslope and throttle movements were transformed by taking the square
root.
The differences in means were significant between levels of the blunder variable
for the square root of throttle standard deviation only.  An ANOVA for the square root of
throttle standard deviation indicates that there is a significant difference (p<0.001), and
Tukey simultaneous tests indicate that the differences were all significant (p<0.02) except
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Figure 8.  Least square means for control movements and glideslope deviation.
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Regressions were run to determine if the subject pilots’ were correlating their
throttle movements with lead aircraft position, safe zone position, or lead aircraft speed.
Regressions for the lead aircraft position and safe zone position were not significant.
However, the regressions for lead aircraft speed show significant correlations, as shown
in Table 2.
Table 2.  Regression p-values for throttle movements by scenario and subject.
 
Scenario type Overall 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
No Noncompliance 0.000 0.004 0.014 0.020 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.040 0.289 0.000 0.000 0.025
Pre Speed Noncompliance 0.001 0.890 0.002 0.083 0.148 0.016 0.112 0.917 0.119 0.524 0.068 0.013 0.403
Post Speed Noncompliance 0.000 0.485 0.060 0.526 0.002 0.055 0.000 0.002 0.012 0.331 0.000 0.001 0.019
Pre Lateral Noncompliance 0.010 0.002 0.062 0.079 0.001 0.000 0.438 0.000 0.025 0.544 0.000 0.000 0.239
Post Lateral Noncompliance 0.142 0.086 0.012 0.936 0.037 0.000 0.622 0.000 0.025 0.538 0.028 0.001 0.717
Subject
Discussion
There are several consequences of these findings. First, since the predicted safe
zone is not accurate when the lead aircraft is violating the approach procedure (such as
departing its approach course), a logical strategy for the pilots when given only the
predicted safe zone display would be to monitor for noncompliance and initiate a go-
around should it be detected. Conversely, since the actual safe zone does not depend upon
the lead aircraft’s compliance to procedure, a logical strategy would be to track the safe
zone and not be concerned with the other aircraft’s compliance. However, the lack of
significant results for detection of blunders indicates that they were probably not using
these strategies.
It appeared instead that pilots were monitoring for compliance regardless of
display type. All twelve pilots mentioned and made frequent use of the text indication of
speed on the navigation display, and four pilots indicated that a lateral trend indicator
would be useful. These observations suggest that the pilots were concerned about
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compliance, but this concern was (incorrectly) independent of the display of the safe
zone. It seems that the pilots were worried about the overall safety of the approach (“Am
I closing on the lead aircraft? Is the lead aircraft turning towards me?”) rather than about
the effect of compliance on the safe zone.
More generally, the pilots’ use of the displayed position of the safe zone appeared
to be independent of the conceptual basis for the display. Eight pilots waited until after
leaving the safe zone before executing a missed approach, despite it being inevitable in
cases where their speed exceeded the lead’s speed. Three other pilots began the missed
approach procedure once it was inevitable that they would leave the safe zone, and the
remaining pilot initiated missed approach once he perceived that the lead aircraft was not
complying with the procedure in some way. In addition, when the lead aircraft departed
its approach course, many pilots chose to remain within the (now inaccurate) predicted
safe zone, just as they had done when presented with just the actual safe zone (which was
still accurate under these circumstances). These findings suggest that the pilots were
using the display of the safe zone as a “go/no-go” indicator; if they could remain within
whichever safe zone was displayed they would continue on the approach, otherwise they
would go around. This lack of distinction concerning the conceptual basis for the safe
zone may have been encouraged by the similar format used for their presentation, which
differed only in color (predicted was green, actual was yellow).
Another logical strategy when both safe zones were displayed would be to use the
predicted safe zone to stabilize position within the safe zone. As essentially a “worst-
case” safe zone, remaining within the predicted safe zone would also ensure that they
remained within the actual safe zone for the duration of the approach. In fact, only two
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pilots made specific attempts to remain behind the predicted safe zone brackets when
both brackets were available, and two other pilots indicated that they felt that the
predicted safe zone display was not useful. This may be because the pilots felt that they
could remain behind the actual safe zone without difficulty, although the actual safe zone
could change length and position rapidly when the lead aircraft maneuvered.
There were a number of additional interesting observations concerning the
participant pilots’ compliance to approach procedures. First, there was a significant time
lag between exiting the safe zone and initiating a go around, even in cases where the
subjects could predict that they would depart the safe zone. In addition, one pilot chose to
remain on his approach path in several scenarios despite leaving the safe zone, as he felt
it unsafe to perform a go-around.
Two other pilots elected to not fly the missed approach as published when the
other aircraft had crossed in front of them (and therefore was flying in the same direction
as the missed approach course). Pilots seemed to be searching for additional confirming
(or dissenting) information to support their decision. This observation is abundantly
confirmed in a number of studies concerning compliance – pilots cannot be assumed to
act automatically to procedures or alerts (Ockerman & Pritchett, 2000).  However, the
uncertainty of this environment may have justified the delays and the deviations from
normal go-around procedures.
Another interesting result is that pilots have a wide variety of methods of
maintaining spacing for current visual closely spaced parallel approaches. Each of the
twelve pilots had a different target separation, ranging from nose-tail to 5 miles. Other
responses included keeping the other aircraft at a 45-degree angle and keeping whatever
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spacing ATC had provided. Four pilots mentioned keeping vertical separation from the
other aircraft. These strategies are problematic, as, for example, maintaining nose-tail
separation is demonstrably unsafe - in this position a sudden turn by the lead aircraft can
cause a loss of separation within ten seconds.
An obvious consequence of these results is that relying on compliance may not be
advisable. A less obvious consequence is that pilots were expecting deviations from
procedures. They therefore monitored information that related to particular deviations,
but still made many errors in interpreting that information.  Successful detection of
noncompliance, moreover, did not translate into the pilots interpreting the consequences
of that noncompliance.
The monitoring that pilots used for this approach appeared to be related to a
strategy which may not have been ideal, but was sufficient and easily implementable.
This strategy required only basic position, speed, and trend information for the other
aircraft. Pilots generally complied with the instructions concerning remaining within the
safe zone, but based their judgment of safety on their own strategy, despite understanding
that the safe zone represented a better model of safety.
Conclusions
During training, pilots indicated an understanding of the different bases of the
displays of the safe zone.  In one case the validity of the safe zone indication was not
dependent upon noncompliance and the indication could continue to be followed; in the
other case the indication was not valid if the lead aircraft violated the procedure.  In both
cases, however, pilots chose to use a heuristic speed-matching strategy and did not react
consistently or correctly to lead noncompliance.  Pilots did not always comply with the
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procedure – in some cases their violations were ill-advised, in others their actions may
have been safer than complying with the procedure.  In either case, pilots may continue to
use procedure information after the procedure no longer applies.
These results suggest that support for procedure following could assist pilots
when flying approaches, and that this support should extend beyond the bounds of the
nominal situations for which the procedure has been shown to apply.  Such support
should provide assistance in not only following procedures and understanding the context




Using Procedure Context to Develop Information Displays to Support Operator
Procedure Following
The results of the preliminary experiment suggested that a more rigorous
examination of how to utilize procedure information was required.  Pilots tended to
follow a heuristic strategy, and, although concerned about noncompliance and trained on
its effect, they were unable to translate this training into action.  As discussed in Chapter
3, procedure context information may assist in providing support for this purpose.
In addition, the use of procedure context allows a shift away from the traditional
focus on supporting compliance to the interactions called for in the procedure.  It defines
the larger role of the procedure within the system’s environment, providing information
to the user about how the specific actions in the procedure affect, and are affected by, the
environment.
Procedure Context for Procedure Turn IAP
The guidance provided for procedure turns is discussed in Chapter 2, and pilots
only have reference to their training and the approach plate while executing the
procedure.  However, there is considerable context about the procedure to which they do
not have access (and for which they probably have not been trained).  In addition, the
complexity of the procedure may make some of the context of the procedure, for which a
pilot has been trained, inaccessible.  Following is a description of each of the elements of
procedure context as it relates to procedure turn IAPs.
Intention
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The intention of the procedure turn IAP is to transition the aircraft safely and
consistently from enroute airspace to a point at which a descent to landing can be made.
Rationale
Each segment of the approach can be considered a step of the IAP.  For each
segment, it is important that the pilot understand the rationale for that part of the IAP.
Table 3 below outlines the major segments of the procedure turn IAP, and the rationale
for that step.
Table 3.  Rationale procedure context for procedure turn IAP.
Segment Rationale
Cross the IAF Marks beginning of approach and identifies a place to begin turn
outbound.
Turn outbound The fly-off outbound enables the pilot to lose altitude and get set up
for a consistent intercept of the final approach course.
Inbound turn
altitude restriction
Keeps aircraft separated from terrain while in protected airspace but
not on final approach.
FAF altitude
restriction
Keep aircraft above terrain until established on final approach.
Timing The MAP is identified as a distance from the FAF, but no distance
measuring equipment is available; timing is therefore used to
identify the MAP.
MDA This is the minimum altitude on final approach that keeps the
aircraft separated from terrain objects.
MAP This is a point at which it has been determined that a safe landing
can no longer be made from the MDA.
Boundary Conditions
Procedure turn IAPs are designed in accordance with FAA Order 8260.3B, titled
"United States Standard for Terminal Procedures" (TERPs).  This document mainly
specifies the airspace restrictions within which the procedure must be confined (i.e. the
protected airspace).  These restrictions form a significant portion of the boundary
conditions for procedure turn IAPs, but do not form a significant part of training, pilot
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reference documents, or displays.  Figure 9 below indicates the protected airspace for a
procedure turn.
Remaining clear of terrain obstacles is one of the main goals of IAPs, and this is
guaranteed only when the pilot (1) remains within the airspace restrictions identified for
the approach, and (2) remains above the specified altitudes for the particular portions of
the approach.  The latter is specifically identified on the approach plate and is (fairly)
easily confirmed on the aircraft’s instruments.  The latter, however, is not clearly









1,000’ clearance in primary area
IAF
Clearance may taper to zero at outer 
edge of secondary area
Figure 9.  Protected airspace for IAP.
Triggering Conditions
Each step in Table 3 has a triggering condition.  These are shown below in Table
4.  The triggers indicate the events that must occur in order to transition from one step or
segment to the next, or the criteria that, when met, releases the pilot from the restriction.
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Table 4.  Triggers for IAP segments.
Segment Trigger
Cross the IAF Station passage as indicated on navigation instruments
Turn outbound After station passage
Inbound turn altitude restriction Until established on the final approach course
FAF altitude restriction Until passing FAF
Timing Start at FAF
MDA Maintain upon reaching until runway in sight or MAP
MAP Upon expiration of timing
Temporal Construct
Due to the navigation instruments used for the procedure turn IAP shown in
Figure 1, the pilot does not have access to any information regarding distance from the
IAF or FAF.  Since the aircraft is (in this case) instructed to remain within 10 miles of the
IAF, and needs to know when the MAP is reached (which is only identified by it being
3.7 NM from the FAF), timing must be used in lieu of distance measurements.  Pilots
remain within 10 miles by flying away from the IAF for only a predetermined amount of
time (generally 1 to 2 minutes).  Pilots identify the MAP by using the timing block on the
approach plate, which identifies different times for a number of groundspeeds.
The groundspeed for the approach differs depending on the aircraft type and pilot
technique, and also will vary over the course of the approach due to imprecision and
winds.  As a result, the actual distance flown for a given time will vary.
For the fly-off from the IAF, it is only important to remain within 10 NM, but it is
nearly impossible for the pilot to be sure of what distance has been flown without
distance information.  To determine this, the pilot would have to mentally integrate the
distance flown given the variation in ground speed.  Of course, an estimate could be
made based on an average speed and time.  For an aircraft flying 120 knots groundspeed
(2 miles per minute), in 2 minutes the aircraft will go 4 miles.  If this estimate is off by 20
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knots, the distance estimate would be off by 2/3 of a mile.  This is not significant unless
the limit is to stay within 5 NM (which is not uncommon for approaches used by general
aviation aircraft).  For faster aircraft, 2 minutes at 4 miles per minute (240 knots) is 8
miles, and if off by 20% the aircraft would be within 2/5 NM of exceeding the 10 NM
limit.
For identifying the MAP, pilots start timing when passing the FAF, and use either
the time associated with the expected final approach speed.  If the expected final
approach speed is not one of the entries on the timing table, pilots typically use the
closest time or interpolate (often crudely) to get a closer time.  This estimate becomes
less accurate the more the groundspeed varies as the pilot flies the final approach.
Without any automation support, however, it is impractical for pilots to
continually adjust these times based on actual groundspeed, to try to more accurately
estimate groundspeed, or to more accurately interpolate fly-off times.
Ordinality
Certain steps are required prior to initiation of others.  For the procedure turn IAP,
the sequence is generally obvious – it is either illogical or physically impossible to do
some steps before others.  For example, it is illogical to perform a course reversal after
passing the FAF.  However, it may also seem illogical to turn back outbound if the final
approach course is intercepted, yet this is required once the IAF is passed.  The reason for
the outbound turn in this case is not to better align the aircraft with the final course but to
enable the pilot to lose altitude and also to keep separation with other aircraft on the
approach ahead of the pilot.  The ordinality constraint here should be identified, and, if
possible the reason for the constraint should be made clear.
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An example of where ordinality is occasionally violated is on the inbound turn
and its associated altitude restriction.  The aircraft must be established on the inbound
course prior to descending below that altitude (Federal Aviation Administration, 2002).
Descending prior to establishing on course inbound may be dangerous in that full terrain
separation assurance may not be provided.  Yet it is not uncommon for pilots to descend
sooner than is allowed by the procedure.
Necessity
For the procedure turn IAP, the only necessary items are the crossing of the IAF,
the direction of turn, the altitude restrictions, the inbound course, the crossing of the FAF,
and the identification of the MAP (Federal Aviation Administration, 2002).  Other
aspects of the approach are techniques for complying with these necessary items.
Reversibility
Errors during the IAP may or may not be reversible.  Dropping below an altitude
restriction can be reversed by climbing back above it, assuming terrain does not
intervene.  Course errors are (hopefully) always being reversed.  If position errors
become extreme, however, it may not be possible to reverse them and resume the
approach.
If navigation errors become large, re-intercepting course in time to complete the
approach may be too difficult to complete safely.  In this case the pilot should abandon
the approach.  The guidance on how to abandon the approach is given by the missed




Much of the procedure turn IAP is non-specific; numerous methods are available
to accomplish the procedure.  This ambiguity is deliberate – the entry may be different
depending on the approach to the IAF, and it is desirable to accommodate a range of
techniques whose relative merits can be evaluated by the pilot under her or his specific
circumstances.
The altitude restrictions depict their specificity.  In the example provided (Figure
1 in Chapter 2), the restrictions are “at or above”, which is indicated by the line below the
altitude.  If the restriction were meant to be “at” only, then there would also be a line
above the altitude.  Similarly, if the restriction were meant to be “at or below”, then there
would only be a line above the altitude.  Altitudes that are simply recommended appear
with no lines (Federal Aviation Administration, 2002).
The timing block appears specific when in fact it is not.  Fluctuations in
groundspeed and variations in where timing is started (relative to the FAF) will change
the time it takes to fly to the MAP.  However, without more specific guidance, the pilot
must rely on the timing estimate.
Previous Step and Following Actions
The sequence of the IAP is fairly well defined, but many individual items need to
be accomplished at nearly the same time.  For instance, when departing the FAF, pilots
need to begin timing, they may need to turn to a new final course, they need to establish a
descent rate, and they may need to make a radio call to announce passing the FAF.
Omitting any of these steps can lead to dangerous or unsafe situations.
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Locational Indication
The procedure has two interconnected axes – the lateral profile of the procedure
and the vertical profile.  Pilots can, with difficulty, identify their position on the
procedure for these two axes.  The workload to do so, however, is typically higher than
pilots can manage while also flying an instrument approach.  Pilots flying the approach
shown in Figure 1 (assuming they do not have access to a GPS display) have only an
NDB to determine their position, and would be significantly taxed to identify their
position with respect to the procedure airspace while manually controlling the aircraft.
The NDB approach is the IAP with the least informative navigation instruments.
Most approaches utilize better navigation aids and instruments.  In these cases pilots
would have better locational procedure context, which may contribute to those
approaches being less error-prone.
Forking
Forking in the procedure occurs when the aircraft must go around.  At that point a
transition to the missed approach procedure must be accomplished.  Pilots must go
around if any of the following are true:
• when reaching the MAP if the runway cannot be seen or a safe landing cannot be
made,
• anytime it is determined a safe landing cannot be made, or
• instructed to do so by ATC (Federal Aviation Administration, 2002).
As mentioned previously, the MAP on the NDB approach is identified by timing,
which makes its identification imprecise.  Yet the missed approach procedure is designed
with the assumption that the aircraft is at the MAP.  Beginning the missed approach
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procedure away from the MAP can impact the ability of the aircraft to complete the
procedure safely or cause separation problems with other aircraft.
Displays for Procedure Turn IAP
Having identified the procedure context for the procedure turn IAP, one can then
identify useful content for displays to support procedure following.  Of interest to this
research is identifying context information whose current presentation is inadequate.
Testing whether displaying that information enhances pilot performance will then provide
evidence of its utility.  Table 5 below shows the context elements, and how those
elements are currently made available to the pilot.
Table 5.  Procedure context elements in the procedure turn IAP.
Element Where found in procedure turn IAP
Intention Training
Rationale Training, FARs, TERPs, Approach plate
Boundary conditions TERPs
Triggering conditions Approach plate, instruments, visual contact with runway
Temporal construct Clock, timing block, groundspeed
Ordinality FARs, Training, Approach plate
Necessity FARs, Approach plate
Reversibility Instruments
Specificity Approach plate, FAR
Previous/Following actions Training, FAR, Approach plate
Location indication Instruments, Approach plate
Forking Instruments, Approach plate
Of the elements in Table 5, several could benefit from being represented in some
way to the pilot other than the manner in which it is currently done.  The rationale for
remaining within 10NM, for the turn to be conducted on a particular side, and for altitude
restrictions is given by TERPs criteria.  However, only minimal elements of this rationale
are provided to the pilot on the approach plate.  A more specific depiction of this
rationale, which could be accomplished by explicitly identifying the protected airspace,
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would be extremely useful for the pilot to see when selecting maneuvers or when the
procedure can no longer be followed in the standard manner.
The temporal constraints on identifying the MAP are given by the appropriate
groundspeed entry on the timing block on the approach plate, and referenced by a clock.
This is not ideal because the actual position of the MAP is based on distance and not
time.  In order for the pilot to convert to time, a particular groundspeed must be chosen
(although actual groundspeed is dynamic).  The pilot must then start the clock at the
correct location, and identify which time matches the entry for that groundspeed in the
timing block.  If the approach groundspeed falls between entries, interpolation may be
required.  For identifying the MAP, this series of estimates and somewhat mentally
taxing operations could be replaced with a more specific, more informative, and more
accurate countdown to the FAF.  One simple improvement would be to perform the
interpolation for the pilot, and display the time left to the MAP.
Altitude restrictions appear on the approach plate, but much of the context
(necessity of the altitude restriction, triggering conditions for passing an altitude
restriction) is not clearly provided to the pilot.  Visual triggers of different vertical phases
of flight and confirmation of the necessity of those restrictions could be identified by
highlighting the currently appropriate altitude restriction.
Other than through a difficult mental transformation of information on the
navigation instruments, the pilot’s location within the procedure is not clearly specified
anywhere on the flight deck.  A location indication of the aircraft’s position within the
procedure should therefore be useful to the pilot.
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Since much of the above information is dynamic, it cannot be solely addressed
through training or a static presentation of the information (such as on an approach plate).
The information, then, may either be presented on an existing dynamic display, or a new
display could be developed.  For experimental purposes, it is desirable to be able to
isolate the effects of adding the context information; minimizing the use of new displays
and new symbology is therefore preferred.
There are three distinct items described above: timing, altitude restrictions, and
procedure location.  The first two may be simply displayed as text or graphically on
existing instruments.  The last requires a display similar to the approach plate itself,
which would require the addition of a new map-like display.
What must be determined, then, is how to display timing information, altitude
information, horizontal location information, and procedure location.  For an operational
display, human factors and HCI principles would be applied to design these displays.  For
purposes of this study, the specific design considerations for an operational display are
left to future studies.  The distinction that is to be tested is whether the addition of
displayed elements of procedure context is useful to the operator; as such, a display that
effectively isolates these elements is needed.  The resulting display, described in Chapter
6, may be not be ideal from an HCI perspective, but needs to provide visibility as to
whether the operator is benefiting from the addition of these display elements as opposed
to anything else that is being presented.
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Chapter 6
Dissertation research - Method
In a preliminary experiment described in Chapter 4, commercial airline pilots flew
a new procedure for executing an instrument approach with another aircraft flying a
simultaneous approach to a closely spaced parallel runway.  That study indicated that
pilots expect noncompliance, and actively search for information to confirm compliance.
However, pilots were unable to interpret the consequences of noncompliance.  In
addition, pilots would sometimes actively and intentionally depart from the procedure if
they felt that it was unsafe.  That experiment suggested that a more rigorous examination
of how procedure information could be used to support procedure following was needed.
It is suggested here that procedure context elements can provide guidance for how
to provide such support.  The previous chapter identified procedure context elements that,
if displayed, might benefit pilots flying procedure turn IAPs.  These elements were
incorporated into a display for purposes of evaluating their effect on procedure-following.
In the dissertation research discussed in this and the following chapters,
participant pilots flew an instrument approach procedure (IAP) with an electronic display
of the procedure.  In some cases this display contained only the information currently
provided on the approach plate, while in other cases the pilot was provided with
additional procedure context.  Pilot performance, workload, and situation awareness
while flying the approach procedure was measured, and statistical tests were applied to
determine if the addition of the displays changed these measures.  This chapter will detail
the task that the participants were asked to perform, the equipment used for the
experiment, the participants, and measures.
68
Experimental considerations
The purpose of this research is to test the belief that procedure context elements
support procedure-following; it is not the purpose of this research to develop an
operational display.  As such, experimental considerations will take precedence over an
implementation that would be operationally viable.
The dissertation research tested the elements discussed in Chapter 5.  These
elements were such that they could be incorporated into the display without providing
benefit to the pilot in the form of improved navigational information or significantly
reduced workload.  For an operational system, these limitations may be a requirement;
nonetheless the analysis would recommend what elements would best provide support,
and what equipment and form such elements should take.
Experiment design
Participant pilots in this experiment flew a procedure turn IAP to Millville
Municipal (an airport in New Jersey).  This approach and airport were chosen due to the
availability of a procedure turn approach, its use of an NDB without distance
information, the low likelihood that participant pilots (who were located in California)
would have flown the approach, and that the airport can be considered to be uncontrolled.
These factors added the desired level of difficulty and realism.
Pilots flew this procedure using a baseline display (electronic format approach
plate without procedure context elements, similar to that shown in Figure 1) in half of the
trials, and flew with an enhanced display (the same electronic format approach plate with
procedure context elements added) in the other half.
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The baseline display was designed to display the same information as the paper
copy with which the subjects were familiar, and the enhanced information was an overlay
of additional information (it did not remove any of the standard information).  During
training the display was discussed in detail to ensure that the pilots knew where
information could be found on the display, and did not have any questions.  Interestingly,
a few subjects noted that the display was based on the FAA version of printed approach
plates rather than those sold by Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc (called Jeppesens).  A
comparison of an FAA version, and the Jeppesen version of the same approach is shown
in Figure 10.  As can be seen from the figure, the two versions are very similar, and after
a review of the electronic version, no subjects noted any difficulty in interpreting it.
(a) (b) (c)
FAA/DOD version Experiment version Jeppesen version
Figure 10.  Comparison of experiment approach plate with Jeppesen and FAA versions.
The enhanced display did not assume any information other than that available to
the other instruments in the aircraft (e.g. it did not use absolute position information such
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as provided by GPS).  This was to ensure that any benefit provided by the enhanced
elements was not due to the addition of information about the environment.
A seventh, deviant scenario was added for subjects 7 through 16.  This deviant
scenario required the subjects to unexpectedly have to fly the approach engine-out,
requiring them to intentionally not comply with the approach procedure.  This was
desirable since one of the goals of the experiment was to investigate intentional
noncompliance, and the expected intentional noncompliance was not being seen in the
trials with the first six participants.
To introduce complexity, the entry angle for the procedure turn was varied.  The
entry angles used were designed to provide the participant with clear guidance as to the
turn required, ambiguous guidance, or conflicting guidance.  To examine whether the
display aid was useful for the missed approach portion of the approach, the weather was
lowered such that the runway would not be seen at the minimum descent altitude, forcing
the pilot to fly a missed approach.
Hypotheses and variables defined
The hypotheses of the experiment are as follows:
H011: The presence of procedure context elements on the display does not
affect situation awareness during nominal operation.
HA11: The presence of procedure context elements on the display affects
situation awareness during nominal operation.
H012: The presence of procedure context elements on the display does not
affect situation awareness during off-nominal operation.
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HA12: The presence of procedure context elements on the display affects
situation awareness during off-nominal operation.
H021:  The presence of procedure context elements on the display does not
affect workload during nominal operation.
HA21: The presence of procedure context elements on the display affects
workload during nominal operation.
H022:  The presence of procedure context elements on the display does not
affect workload during off-nominal operation.
HA22: The presence of procedure context elements on the display affects
workload during off-nominal operation.
H031:  The presence of procedure context elements on the display does not
affect safety during nominal operation.
HA31:  The presence of procedure context elements on the display affects safety
during nominal operation.
H032:  The presence of procedure context elements on the display does not
affect safety during off-nominal operation.
HA32:  The presence of procedure context elements on the display affects safety
during off-nominal operation.
The measures available to test these hypotheses are shown in Table 6.
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Table 6.  Hypotheses and measures.
Hypotheses Measure Units
H011- HA12 Errors in subjects’ recollection of ground track Number of errors
H011- HA12 Errors in subjects’ recollection of speed deviations Number of errors
H011- HA12 Error in subjects’ recollection of altitude deviations Number of errors
H011- HA12 Errors in subjects’ recollection of missed approach deviations Number of errors
H021- HA22 NASA TLX workload ratings 1-24 scale subjective rating
H021- HA22
H031- HA32
Variance of control inputs Degrees of bank and pitch
H031- HA32 Altitude errors Number and duration of errors
H031- HA32 Track errors Number and duration of errors
The variables and levels in the experiment are:
A. Subjects (blocking variable)
B. Presence of procedure context elements on the display
 i. Present
 ii. Not Present




The experiment represents a randomized 2-factor block design, with one variable
(“display”) having two levels, and the second variable (“entry”) having three levels.  As
mentioned previously, the last nine subjects flew an additional deviant scenario, which
will be considered separately from the other scenarios.  Each pilot flew two or three
practice approaches and then six (seven for those subjects who flew the deviant scenario)
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trials representing each case of the 2x3 test matrix shown in Table 7 and described above
(variables B and C).  To counterbalance the effect of having the enhanced displays, half
of the pilots flew the A trials first, and half of the pilots flew the B trials first.  The order
of the trials (within the A and B trials) was randomized.











Pilots were provided with an electronic version of the approach plate for the NDB
procedure turn approach to Millville Municipal Airport.  The actual approach plate is
shown in Figure 11a, the electronic version is shown in Figure 11b.  Since the pilots were
required to be instrument trained, each will have already been trained on how to fly a
generic procedure turn IAP.  A full description of how to fly a procedure turn is provided
in Chapter 2.  In general, since the aircraft may approach the procedure turn fix from any
direction, the actual direction and extent of turns required vary by individual
circumstance.  The pilot must decide, based on the direction of entry, how to enter the




Figure 11.  Millville NDB Runway 14 approach plate and electronic version.
For this task, three initial positions were used, as shown in Figure 12a through
12c.  One position (Figure 12a) was such that the aircraft approached the procedure turn
fix conveniently aligned to perform a 45º-180º or a 80º-260º entry, so that a left turn to
the outbound course began the procedure.  From a second position (Figure 12b) pilots
were conveniently aligned to perform either a teardrop entry or a holding entry, and could
have either turned to parallel the course outbound, or turned 45º to the right to enter the
protected airspace.  From a third position (Figure 12c) no convenient entry maneuver
existed, so that the pilot was unable to begin the procedure turn on the protected side
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unless some deviation from either ATC instructions or the instrument approach procedure
was performed.
a b c
Figure 12. Starting positions and angles of entry.
Also included on the approach plate were missed approach instructions.  These
procedures are designed to transition the aircraft from the approach back into the air
traffic flow so it can be resequenced.   A close-up of the missed approach instructions for




Figure 13.  Missed approach instructions at top of approach plate.
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The missed approach occurred at the missed approach point (Figure 14), as
indicated by the expiration of timing which estimates the passage of 3.7 nm from the
FAF.
Figure 14.  Location of missed approach
For the B set of trials, participants were provided with an enhanced display for the
procedure turn IAP.  This display contained the elements discussed in Chapter 5 and is
shown in Figure 15.
Each participant was briefed on the equipment and the task, filled out a
questionnaire regarding demographics, performed two practice approaches (3 subjects
requested and flew one additional practice approach), and then performed 6 or 7
approaches corresponding to the experiment matrix.  During each approach, data were
recorded.  The trials were videotaped as a backup to the data collection process.  After
each approach a questionnaire regarding the entry and missed approach was administered














Figure 15.  Enhanced display.
Equipment
The equipment setup is shown in Figure 16.  The participant pilots flew a desktop
flight simulator running on a 1.2 GHz IBM Thinkpad R31 laptop computer running
Windows XP.  The software used was Microsoft Flight Simulator 2002, with the standard
flight instruments (except for the addition of the electronic approach plate) for the type of
airplane used in the simulation.  The simulation airplane was a Cessna 182 (instruments
shown in Figure 17) was used for all trials.  Procedure context elements were added to
the electronic approach plate for the B trials.
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Figure 16.  Experiment setup.
Figure 17.  Instrument panel Cessna 182.
79
A CH Products Flight Sim control yoke and throttle quadrant, and CH Products
rudder pedals was used to control the aircraft.  This control yoke includes controls for
flap position, pitch and aileron trim, mixture control, and prop speed.
The simulator was set up for IFR flight to Millville Municipal Airport in New
Jersey, with weather set at calm winds, overcast at 400 feet above ground level, and 10
miles visibility.  This weather prevented the pilot from seeing any terrain features, and
forced her or him to rely solely on instruments to perform the procedure turn and
approach.  The aircraft positions were preset to the positions described earlier, at an
altitude of about 2,600 feet, and about 120 knots.
For subjects 7 – 16 the simulator was preset with an engine failure.  Shortly
before the aircraft passed the IAF the engine quit, requiring the pilot to try to turn
towards the runway and land.
Participants
Participants were 16 private pilots from the West Valley Flying Club in Palo Alto,
California who were recruited through advertisements at the club and on their newsletter,
and also through email.  Subjects were paid $50 for their participation, and no incentives
for performance were offered.  The advertisements stated that the pilots had to be
instrument trained and comfortable flying procedure turn instrument approaches.
The experiment was conducted in a flight debriefing area at the club facility on
the grounds of the Palo Alto Municipal Airport.  Subject 13 was dismissed and his data
was not used after he indicated he was not instrument trained.  The remaining 15 subjects
were instrument trained and indicated that they were familiar with the procedure turn
IAP.  Each volunteer was questioned regarding their level of knowledge of instrument
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procedures in general and of the procedure turn in particular.  3 of the 15 subjects were
female, and 5 were instructors.  One subject was air transport pilot rated, 4 were
commercial, multi-engine rated, 2 were private, multi-engine rated, and the rest of the
subjects (8) were private pilot rated.  All but one subject were instrument rated; the one
subject who was not was an advanced student recommended by his instructor (another
subject).  Age and hours, both total and instrument, were recorded, and are shown in
Table 8.
Table 8.  Age, total hours, and instrument hours for participants.
Age Total Hours Instrument Hours
Median 35 700 90
Minimum 26 152 30
Maximum 51 13700 3000
Measures
Aircraft state data were recorded by Microsoft Flight Simulator then imported
into Microsoft Excel, Minitab, and S-Plus.  These packages were used to analyze the
data.  The state data recorded were aircraft position, speed, heading, altitude, and control
actions.  The names and descriptions of the data recorded are shown in Table 9.
After each trial, a questionnaire designed to test the pilots’ situation awareness of
what transpired was administered.  This questionnaire is shown in Appendix 1.  The
subjects were asked to indicate on a map their initial position and ground track for the
flight they just completed.  Next, the pilots were asked to indicate their recollection of
any deviations from the altitude requirements, the speed requirements, or the missed
approach requirements of the procedure, and the reasons for those deviations.
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Table 9.  Data recorded
Name Description
ADF_NEEDLE Relative bearing of NDB
AIRSPEED True airspeed in knots
ATTITUDE_INDICATOR_BANK_DEGREES Indicated degrees of bank
ATTITUDE_INDICATOR_PITCH_DEGREES Indicated degrees of pitch
ELAPSED_SECONDS Number of seconds since start of simulation
ELEVATOR_TRIM Degrees of pitch trim
ENGINE1_THROTTLE_LEVER_POS Position of throttle
FLAPS_HANDLE_POS Position of flap handle in degrees
ELEVATOR_POS Position of elevator in degrees
RUDDER_PEDAL_POS Position of rudder in degrees
YOKE_POS_X Position of yoke for roll axis
YOKE_POS_Y Position of yoke for pitch axis
PLANE_ALTITUDE Altitude of aircraft in feet
PLANE_HEADING_DEGREES_GYRO Indicated heading of the aircraft
PLANE_LATITUDE Current latitude of aircraft
PLANE_LONGITUDE Current longitude of aircraft
VERTICAL_SPEED Vertical speed of the aircraft in feet per second
After the situation awareness questionnaires were completed, pilots were asked to
fill out a NASA TLX workload questionnaire, also shown in Appendix 1.
The data described in Table 9 were used to produce several composite measures.
The actual ground track of the aircraft was provided by the PLANE_LATITUDE and
PLANE_LONGITUDE variables.  Subjects’ estimates of position as drawn on the map were
compared with each subject’s recollection of the aircraft’s ground track for the following:
• starting position





• position crossing the IAF
• final approach track
• position when starting the missed approach
The subject’s recollection was scored as to being correct (1) or incorrect (0), and the sum
of these 8 represented the subject’s score for recall of lateral position.
The actual track of the flight was compared with the minimums for the approach
to obtain a measure of flight error.  Laterally the procedure required the pilot to remain
on a bearing of 327º from the NDB when inbound to the FAF, then follow the 147º
bearing out of the NDB until the MAP.  Vertically the pilots were required to stay above
2000 feet until on the 327º bearing from the NDB inbound, stay above 1300 feet until the
FAF, then stay above 520 feet for the remainder of the approach.  The sampled position
and altitude were compared with these limits for the appropriate parts of the approach to
obtain a measure of error.  Both the magnitude and duration of the error was calculated.
In addition, when flight error was detected, the pilot’s correction back to the
procedure was calculated.  This was intended to provide an indication of when the error
was recognized by the pilot.
The number of control inputs was extracted from the
GENERAL_ENG_THROTTLE_LEVER_1_POSITION, YOKE_Y_POSITION,
YOKE_X_POSITION, and RUDDER_PEDAL_POSITION variables.  The values of these
variables were plotted, and summary statistics determined.  More frequent and greater
extent of control inputs are an indicator of increased workload, and also provide a
measure of the stability of the approach.  Greater stability on the approach is desirable,




The measures described in the previous chapter were analyzed using Minitab and
S-plus, with the following results.  The deviant scenario will be described separately.  For
the analysis described below, results are found to be significant if the P-value of a test is
below 0.05, and are found to be marginally significant if the P-value is between 0.05 and
0.10.
General results and observations
There were obvious differences between the participants’ abilities, but all were
able to fly the approaches without exiting the protected airspace for the approach.  Every
pilot successfully performed a reversal maneuver, flew inbound, descended to the MDA,
and executed a missed approach.  Additionally, each pilot attempted to maintain the
proper course and altitude, and either corrected or mentioned deviations.
With one exception, all errors over 1.5NM on the non-maneuvering side of the
approach airspace occurred with the baseline display.  The exception was a case in which
the subject was intentionally deviating from procedure; the subject had the same error
while using both the baseline and enhanced displays.  There were a total of nine such
errors involving 5 subjects, and 7 occurred with the conflicting entry case.  The largest
error took the participant’s aircraft 3.6 NM off course, 0.4 NM from the boundary of the
primary obstacle clearance area.
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The majority of the pilots flew the approaches in the same way, regardless of
entry.  Table 10 indicates that in 84 out of 90 cases, the 45-180 maneuver was selected.
This was somewhat surprising, and resulted in less variation in the entry maneuver than
was anticipated.  It was expected that for the ambiguous case, many subjects would use
the racetrack entry (only 1 subject did so, once with each display).  It was also expected
that for the conflicting case, numerous subjects would see the need to depart from the
procedure (only 1 subject did so, once with each display).
Table 10.  Maneuvers used by entry.
             Ambiguous  Clear  Conflicting  All
45-180              28     29           27   84
Adhoc                0      1            3    4
Racetrack            2      0            0    2
Ad-hoc maneuvers were maneuvers that did not fit into any of the normal
techniques described in Chapter 2.  Two of these cases were attributed to one subject
(once with the baseline display, once with the enhanced display) who performed a
racetrack on the wrong side of the inbound approach course for the conflicting entry
scenario.  This subject recognized that he was on the non-maneuvering side, continued
outbound on that side, then reversed course (correctly, but in the opposite direction
indicated by the procedure) back towards the maneuvering airspace.  These wrong-way
racetrack maneuvers represented an intentional violation of procedure. The other two ad-
hoc entry maneuvers were essentially a hybrid of the 45-180 and 80-260 maneuvers
which did not technically violate the procedure.
Despite the NDB being a very imprecise navigation aid, in 42% of the cases
participant pilots were right on course at the point where they would have had to visually
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identify the runway.  Only in 20% of the cases were the subjects clearly not in a position
to land at the end of the approach, and the pilots were still heading roughly toward the
runway in even those cases.  Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric tests across the variables
indicated a significant difference by subject (p=0.003), but not for display, entry, or order
of runs.
Statistics of error between recollection of ground track and actual ground track
For this measure, a comparison is being made between the actual ground track
and the recalled ground track.  A score was compiled for each experimental run.  A
minimum of 0 was possible, and a maximum of 8 was possible.  No subject scored below
2, and no question was always answered right or wrong.  The data will be checked to see
if significant differences exist by subjects, display type, or entry.  A summary of the data












1st Q uartile 4.7500
Median 6.0000
3rd Q uartile 7.0000
Maximum 8.0000




95% C onfidence Interv al for Median
6.0000 6.0000
95% C onfidence Interv al for StDev
1.5167 2.0380





Figure 18. Summary of lateral_recall_score
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The recall score is mildly right skewed (-0.55), and fails the Anderson-Darling
normality test.  No other serious anomaly is apparent for the data.  A tabulation of the
data is shown in Appendix 2.
None of the scores or groupings stand out significantly from the overall mean and
median, and none have excessive or low standard deviations.  A boxplot of the values for
the subjects and independent variables is shown in Figure 19(a) through (c).  Figure 19(d)
shows the boxplot for order of runs to check for learning effects.
Figure 19(a) indicates some differences between subjects; particularly noticeable
are the high scores of subject 10.  Figure 19(b) does not seem to indicate any effect by the
entry variable.  Figure 19(c) shows a possible increase in scores for the enhanced display
over the baseline display.  Figure 19(d) does not seem to indicate any effect due to the
order of runs.  A few outliers are noticed on the boxplots, but these scores were checked
for accuracy and were found to be correct, so they were not discarded.
Although the data did not pass the Anderson-Darlington normality test, both the
Ryan-Joiner and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicated normality (p>0.1), so an ANOVA
was run.  The departure from normality exhibited by the variable seemed mild, with a
slight right skew and no large differences in variance, except perhaps for the scores of
subjects 10 and 12, who had small variances in scores.  Since the effect of the display
variable may not be uniform across entry types, these variables were checked for
interaction effects.  Figure 20 shows that the display variable may not have had the same
effect for each level of the entry variable, so the model did not include this interaction


























































































































Interaction Plot (data means) for Recall_Score
Figure 20.  Interaction plot for display and entry variables.
88
The ANOVA indicates a significant difference across display (p=0.020), but not for
subject, entry, or the interaction term.
Table 11. ANOVA for lateral recall score.
Analysis of Variance for Recall_Score, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source         DF   Seq SS   Adj SS  Adj MS     F      P
Subject        14   52.622   52.622   3.759  1.41  0.174
Display         1   15.211   15.211  15.211  5.69  0.020
Entry           2    5.756    5.756   2.878  1.08  0.346
Display*Entry   2    8.422    8.422   4.211  1.58  0.214
Error          70  187.111  187.111   2.673
Total          89  269.122
 Figure 21 indicates that the mean recall score was higher for the enhanced level.
Interestingly, the interactions plot (Figure 20) shows that most of this difference came
from the improvement provided for the ambiguous and conflicting entry scenarios,
although the results of the ANOVA could not reject the hypothesis that the interaction
term was not significant.
A check of the residuals is shown in Figure 22.  One point seems to be
troublesome, with a very low (negative) residual.  There is some indication of a reverse
funnel shape to the residuals versus fitted values, which may be due to there being few
high fitted values.  The residuals seem to show no dependence on order (the data were
ordered by the sequence of runs).  These results suggest that caution should be used in




























Main Effects Plot (data means) for Recall_Score


















































Normal Probability Plot of the Residuals Residuals Versus the Fitted Values
Histogram of the Residuals Residuals Versus the Order of the Data
Residual Plots for Recall_Score
Figure 22.  Residuals for lateral recall score ANOVA.
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Error in recall of altitude deviations
The next variable to be checked is the error between the subjects’ recall of altitude
deviations.  The subjects answered 3 questions about their compliance to altitude, which
was checked against the record of their actual altitude profile.  A minimum of 0 was
possible, and a maximum of 3 was possible.  No subject scored below 1, and no question
was always answered right or wrong.  The data will be checked to see if significant
differences exist by subjects, order of runs, display type, or entry.
Figure 23 shows that the data is skewed right, and again does not pass the
Anderson-Darlington test for normality.  However, the data passes both the Kolmogorov-













1st Q uartile 2.0000
Median 3.0000
3rd Q uartile 3.0000
Maximum 3.0000




95% C onfidence Interv al for Median
3.0000 3.0000
95% C onfidence Interv al for StDev
0.5303 0.7126





Figure 23.  Graphical summary of altitude recall statistics.
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The mean of all scores is between 2.4 and 2.933, although there are some
differences in standard deviations (minimum is 0.2582, maximum is 0.8281).
This is itself somewhat interesting, suggesting that the variance for the enhanced
display is lower and less variable than for the baseline display.  This is probably caused
by the maximum score being anchored at 3. If the performance using the enhanced



























































Boxplot of Vert_Score vs Order
Figure 24.  Boxplot of other recall scores by display.
Figure 24 seems to indicate some differences across subject and perhaps order, as
well as for display.  The interactions plot in Figure 25 seems to indicate a fairly constant
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effect of display across entry type, so no interactions were included in the model.  An
ANOVA was run against these subject, entry, and order, and the results shown in Table
12.
Table 12.  ANOVA for vertical recall.
Analysis of Variance for VertScore, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source   DF   Seq SS   Adj SS  Adj MS      F      P
Subject  14   9.0667   9.0667  0.6476   2.38  0.009
Display   1   4.0111   4.0111  4.0111  14.77  0.000
Entry     2   0.2667   0.2667  0.1333   0.49  0.614
Error    72  19.5556  19.5556  0.2716


















Interaction Plot (data means) for VertScore
Figure 25.  Interaction plot for vertical score between entry and display.
The ANOVA indicates a significant effect for subject (as expected) and display.






















Main Effects Plot (fitted means) for VertScore


















































Normal Probability Plot of the Residuals Residuals Versus the Fitted Values
Histogram of the Residuals Residuals Versus the Order of the Data
Residual Plots for VertScore
Figure 27.  Residual plots for vertical score.
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The residuals plots, shown in Figure 27, do not indicate that the residuals depart
significantly from normality or constant variance, and also do not indicate any
dependence on order of runs.
Recall of approach speed and missed approach deviations
Subjects were also questioned about approach speed and missed approach
deviations.  For these measures, the subject was asked one question each, so the results
were either correct/incorrect.  As categorical data, effects of the variables on the results
were checked with nonparametric tests.
Approach speed
No significant effect of any variable was found on the ability of the subject to
recall approach speed deviations.
Missed approach
No significant effect for subject, order, or entry was found to exist for the ability
of the subject to recall missed approach deviations.  However, a marginally significant
effect (p=0.069) was indicated for display, as shown in Table 13.
Table 13.  Nonparametric test for effect of display on recall of missed approach errors.
Kruskal-Wallis Test on MA
Display    N  Median  Ave Rank      Z
Baseline  45   1.000      40.5  -1.82
Enhanced  45   1.000      50.5   1.82
Overall   90              45.5
H = 3.30  DF = 1  P = 0.069
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A plot of the means for the missed approach recall by display is shown in Figure

















Main Effects Plot (data means) for MA
Figure 28.  Plot of mean score for missed approach error recall by display.
NASA TLX workload ratings
Subjective assessments of workload ratings were taken upon completion of each
experimental run.  Workload was rated for 6 aspects: mental demand, physical demand,
temporal demand, effort, performance, and frustration.  The rating scale for each aspect
allowed for a rating of between 0 and 24.
Mental_demand
Mental demand represents the amount of cognitive work that the subject expends













1st Q uartile 7.000
Median 15.000
3rd Q uartile 18.000
Maximum 23.000




95% C onfidence Interv al for Median
11.000 17.000
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Figure 29.  Mental demand summary.
This variable does not appear normal, and fails all tests of normality.  Since the
data seem to have multiple peaks, simple transformations will not bring it into normality.
One might suspect that the distribution is being affected by significant differences in the
base level of workload ratings for the subjects.  In that case, the workload ratings could
be reformatted as a “relative” workload (relative to the median workload).
As can be seen from the boxplots in Figure 30, this is the case.  There seems to be
a significant difference in not only the base level of workload rating, but also in the
variance of workload across subjects.
The ratings were recalculated as the difference between the actual rating and the





















Boxplot of Mental_Demand vs Subject












1st Q uartile -1.6250
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Figure 31.  Graphical summary of relative mental workload ratings.
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The data looks considerably more normal, but, due to its high kurtosis, it still fails
all tests of normality.  The histogram is reflecting the high number of times that the
subject evaluated that no change in mental workload occurred between runs.  Simple
transformations were unable to alter this distribution sufficiently.  Two approaches are
considered and used here: (1) use ANOVA with a reduced _ (0.025) and (2)
nonparametric f test (Kruskal-Wallis).
The results of the ANOVA are shown in Table 14.  It indicates that there is only a
significant effect of sequence of runs on mental workload.  A plot of the means is shown
in Figure 32, and shows that the earlier scenarios had higher workload than the later
scenarios.  This result is consistent with there being a learning effect on mental workload.
Table 14. Analysis of Variance for Relative_Mental_Demand, using Adjusted SS for Tests.
Source    DF    Seq SS   Adj SS  Adj MS     F      P
Subject   14   102.400  102.400   7.314  0.73  0.734
Display    1     9.344   15.556  15.556  1.56  0.216
Entry      2    10.467    6.904   3.452  0.35  0.709
Sequence   5   232.081  232.081  46.416  4.65  0.001
Error     67   668.608  668.608   9.979
Total     89  1022.900
Tukey simultaneous tests on the above means indicates that the differences
between 2 and 4, 5, and 6 are significant (0.0172<p<0.0230) and marginally significant
between 1 and 4, 5, and 6 (0.0429<p<0.0586).
As mentioned above, Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric tests were run to confirm and


































Main Effects Plot (data means) for Relative_Mental_Demand
Figure 32.  Means of mental demand workload vs. sequence of runs.
Table 15.  Results of Kruskal-Wallis tests on effect of variables on mental workload.
 (a)  Kruskal-Wallis Test for Subject
H = 5.19  DF = 14  P = 0.983
H = 5.33  DF = 14  P = 0.981  (adjusted for ties)
(b)  Kruskal-Wallis Test for Display
H = 2.64  DF = 1  P = 0.104
H = 2.71  DF = 1  P = 0.099  (adjusted for ties)
(c)  Kruskal-Wallis Test on for Entry
H = 0.14  DF = 2  P = 0.934
H = 0.14  DF = 2  P = 0.932  (adjusted for ties)
(d)  Kruskal-Wallis Test for Sequence
H = 18.16  DF = 5  P = 0.003
H = 18.65  DF = 5  P = 0.002  (adjusted for ties)
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As expected, the test shows a significant effect of sequence.  However, the test
also shows a marginally significant effect for display, which was not indicated by the
ANOVA.  This discrepancy could occur if more early scenarios used the enhanced
display. Pairwise comparisons were unable to differentiate between levels, but a plot of
the means across display and sequence (Figure 33) shows that the means are lower for the
enhanced display for all runs except the first and fifth runs, where the means are nearly
equal.  The largest differences in means occur for the second, third, and sixth runs, where


















Interaction Plot (data means) for Relative_Mental_Demand
Figure 33.  Plot of means of mental workload for sequence and display.
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Physical_demand
The ratings for physical demand were also normalized across each subject to
provide a relative physical demand measure for each scenario.  A summary of the data
(Figure 34) shows that this distribution is again not normal and the same technique used
for mental workload will be used.
An ANOVA was run and the results shown in Table 16.  It again shows a
significant effect for sequence.
Table 16. Analysis of Variance for Relative_Physical_Demand, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source    DF   Seq SS   Adj SS  Adj MS     F      P
Subject   14  135.622  135.622   9.687  1.13  0.350
Display    1    0.044    1.029   1.029  0.12  0.730
Entry      2   16.022   16.573   8.287  0.97  0.386
Sequence   5  155.224  155.224  31.045  3.62  0.006
Error     67  574.709  574.709   8.578
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Figure 34.  Graphical summary of physical demand workload measure.
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A plot of the means for physical demand against sequence is shown in Figure 35,
and, as expected, shows lower workload measures for later runs.  Kruskal-Wallis tests
were run to support the ANOVA results and are shown in Table 17(a) to (d).
Table 17.  Nonparametric test results for physical workload measure.
(a)  Kruskal-Wallis Test for Subject
H = 6.48  DF = 14  P = 0.953
H = 6.63  DF = 14  P = 0.948  (adjusted for ties)
(b)  Kruskal-Wallis Test for Display
H = 0.01  DF = 1  P = 0.926
H = 0.01  DF = 1  P = 0.925  (adjusted for ties)
(c)  Kruskal-Wallis Test on for Entry
H = 1.13  DF = 2  P = 0.569
H = 1.15  DF = 2  P = 0.561  (adjusted for ties)
(d)  Kruskal-Wallis Test for Sequence
H = 20.88  DF = 5  P = 0.001
H = 21.38  DF = 5  P = 0.001  (adjusted for ties)
Tukey simultaneous tests on the above means indicates that the difference
between 2 and 5 is significant (p=0.0253) and marginally significant between 1 and 5





































Main Effects Plot (data means) for Relative_Physical_Demand
Figure 35.  Plot of means of mental demand workload rating vs. sequence.
Temporal_demand
As previously, the ratings for temporal demand were normalized across each
subject to provide a relative temporal demand measure for each scenario.  A summary of
the data (Figure 36) shows that this distribution is again not normal and the same













1st Q uartile -0.50000
Median 0.00000
3rd Q uartile 0.62500
Maximum 7.00000




95% C onfidence Interv al for Median
0.00000 0.00000
95% C onfidence Interv al for StDev
1.93983 2.60658





Figure 36. Graphical summary of the temporal demand workload ratings.
An ANOVA was run and the results shown in Table 18.  It shows a marginally
significant effect for sequence only.
Table 18. Analysis of Variance for Relative_Temporal_Demand, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source    DF   Seq SS   Adj SS  Adj MS     F      P
Subject   14   36.556   36.556   2.611  0.51  0.916
Display    1    2.844    4.346   4.346  0.86  0.358
Entry      2    2.156    2.556   1.278  0.25  0.778
Sequence   5   58.924   58.924  11.785  2.32  0.052
Error     67  339.742  339.742   5.071
Total     89  440.222
A plot of the means for physical demand against sequence is shown in Figure 37,
and, as expected, shows lower workload measures for later runs.  Kruskal-Wallis tests


































Main Effects Plot (fitted means) for Relative_Temporal_Demand
Figure 37.  Plot of means of tmeporal demand workload rating vs. sequence.
Table 19.  Nonparametric test results for physical workload measure.
(a)  Kruskal-Wallis Test for Subject
H = 7.73  DF = 14  P = 0.903
H = 8.43  DF = 14  P = 0.866  (adjusted for ties
(b)  Kruskal-Wallis Test for Display
H = 2.01  DF = 1  P = 0.157
H = 2.19  DF = 1  P = 0.139  (adjusted for ties)
(c)  Kruskal-Wallis Test on for Entry
H = 0.10  DF = 2  P = 0.951
H = 0.11  DF = 2  P = 0.946  (adjusted for ties)
(d)  Kruskal-Wallis Test for Sequence
H = 14.09  DF = 5  P = 0.015
H = 15.36  DF = 5  P = 0.009  (adjusted for ties)
Tukey simultaneous tests on the above means indicates that a marginally
significant difference could be detected between 2 and 5 (p = 0.0867) only.
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Effort
As previously, the ratings for effort were normalized across each subject to
provide a relative effort measure for each scenario.  A summary of the data (Figure 38)
shows a better distribution.  The distribution fails the Anderson-Darling normality test,
but passes both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Ryan-Joiner normality tests.  Since the
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Figure 38.  Graphical summary of effort rating.
An ANOVA was run and the results shown in Table 20.  It shows a significant
effect for both subject and sequence.
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Table 20. Analysis of Variance for Effort, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source    DF   Seq SS   Adj SS  Adj MS      F      P
Subject   14  2673.07  2673.07  190.93  19.74  0.000
Display    1     0.40     2.10    2.10   0.22  0.642
Entry      2     2.07     2.14    1.07   0.11  0.895
Sequence   5   154.71   154.71   30.94   3.20  0.012
Error     67   648.15   648.15    9.67
Total     89  3478.40
A plot of the means for physical demand against sequence is shown in Figure 39,




















Main Effects Plot (fitted means) for Effort
Figure 39.  Plot of means of effort rating vs. sequence.
Tukey simultaneous tests on the above means indicates that a marginally
significant difference could be detected between 1 and 4 (p = 0.0833) only.
Figure 40 shows the means for each subject.  Deviation from zero for a subject
indicates a difference between the median and mean, since these ratings were relative to
the median.  This occurs when one or more of the subject’s ratings are relatively high or
108


























Main Effects Plot (data means) for Relative_Effort















































Scatterplot of Relative_Effort vs Sequence
Subject = 12
(a) (b)
Figure 41.  Plot of effort measures for subjects 8 and 12.
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Subject 8 rated the first and third runs (both of which used the enhanced display)
much higher than the median.  Subject 12 rated the second run (which used the enhanced
display) well below the median.
Performance
As previously, the ratings for performance were normalized across each subject to
provide a relative performance measure for each scenario.  A summary of the data
(Figure 42) shows that this data is again not normal and the same technique used for
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Figure 42.  Graphical summary of performance ratings.
An ANOVA was run and the results shown in Table 21.  It shows a marginally
significant effect for sequence only.
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Table 21.  Analysis of Variance for Relative_Performance, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source    DF   Seq SS  Adj SS  Adj MS     F      P
Subject   14   146.60  146.60   10.47  0.77  0.697
Display    1     1.34    3.10    3.10  0.23  0.635
Entry      2    17.27   15.28    7.64  0.56  0.573
Sequence   5   177.86  177.86   35.57  2.62  0.032
Error     67   911.02  911.02   13.60
Total     89  1254.10
A plot of the means for performance against sequence is shown in Figure 43, and,
as expected, shows lower workload measures for later runs.  Kruskal-Wallis tests were





























Main Effects Plot (data means) for Relative_Performance
Figure 43.  Plot of means of performance rating vs. sequence.
Tukey simultaneous tests on the above means found no detectable differences by
sequence.
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Table 22.  Nonparametric test results for performance measure.
(a)  Kruskal-Wallis Test for Subject
H = 5.17  DF = 14  P = 0.983
H = 5.31  DF = 14  P = 0.981  (adjusted for ties)
(b)  Kruskal-Wallis Test for Display
H = 0.03  DF = 1  P = 0.869
H = 0.03  DF = 1  P = 0.867  (adjusted for ties)
(c)  Kruskal-Wallis Test on for Entry
H = 3.09  DF = 2  P = 0.213
H = 3.17  DF = 2  P = 0.205  (adjusted for ties)
(d)  Kruskal-Wallis Test for Sequence
H = 10.11  DF = 5  P = 0.072
H = 10.39  DF = 5  P = 0.065  (adjusted for ties)
Frustration
As previously, the ratings for frustration were normalized across each subject to
provide a relative frustration measure for each scenario.  A summary of the data (Figure
44) shows that this distribution is again not normal and the same technique used for
mental workload will be used here.  It also shows a long right tail, indicating a few very
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Figure 44. Graphical summary for frustration ratings.
An ANOVA was run and the results shown in Table 23.  It shows a marginally
significant effect for sequence only.
Table 23.  Analysis of Variance for Relative_Frustration, using Adjusted SS for Tests.
Source    DF   Seq SS  Adj SS  Adj MS     F      P
Subject   14   156.40  156.40   11.17  0.90  0.567
Display    1     0.04    0.40    0.40  0.03  0.858
Entry      2    11.47   11.29    5.64  0.45  0.638
Sequence   5   250.05  250.05   50.01  4.01  0.003
Error     67   835.44  835.44   12.47
Total     89  1253.40
A plot of the means for performance against sequence is shown in Figure 45, and,
as expected, shows lower workload measures for later runs.  Kruskal-Wallis tests were





























Main Effects Plot (fitted means) for Relative_Frustration
Figure 45.  Plot of frustration rating means vs. sequence.
Table 24.  Nonparametric test results for performance measure.
(a)  Kruskal-Wallis Test for Subject
H = 5.10  DF = 14  P = 0.984
H = 5.28  DF = 14  P = 0.981  (adjusted for ties)
(b)  Kruskal-Wallis Test for Display
H = 0.05  DF = 1  P = 0.815
H = 0.06  DF = 1  P = 0.812  (adjusted for ties)
(c)  Kruskal-Wallis Test on for Entry
H = 1.66  DF = 2  P = 0.436
H = 1.72  DF = 2  P = 0.423  (adjusted for ties)
(d)  Kruskal-Wallis Test for Sequence
H = 20.45  DF = 5  P = 0.001
H = 21.19  DF = 5  P = 0.001  (adjusted for ties)
)
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Tukey simultaneous tests on the above means found significant differences
between run 1 and 5 (p=0.0200) and run 2 and 5 (p=0.0114), and a marginally significant
difference between runs 2 and 4 (p=0.0673).
Number, frequency, and magnitude of control inputs
An analysis was conducted on the subject’s control inputs.  The subjects’ inputs
were accomplished using the yoke, which affected simulated control movements of the
ailerons (for bank control) and elevator (for pitch control).  These control inputs were
caused changes in the bank angle and the pitch angle, which were also recorded.  As the
latter are more meaningful and exactly correlated with control movements, they will be
used for the analysis.
The measures were grouped over 30 second periods and a mean and variance
were calculated.  The mean would then indicate the general trend of the control and the
variance would be a measure of the stability of the control inputs.  As such, the mean is
unimportant, but high variance would indicate instability and is undesirable, particularly
on the latter parts of the approach.
Bank angle













1st Q uartile 0.224
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Figure 46.  Data summary for bank variance.
The summary shows that the distribution is not normal, with the majority of
variance measures being near zero with a number of very high outliers.  No outliers could
be eliminated, and transformations were unsuccessful at normalizing the data.
Boxplots for the bank variance (Figure 47) shows differences in variance for
different periods and for different subjects.  Nonparametric tests showed significant
differences between subject (p<0.001), order (p = 0.02), and time (p<0.001), but failed to













































































































































Boxplot of Bank_var_deg vs Elapsed_time_sec
Figure 47.  Boxplots of bank variance by time, entry, display, and subject.
Pitch
The data summary for pitch is shown in Figure 48. The data is very similar to the
bank angle data, and again is not normal.  No outliers could be removed, and
transformations failed to normalize the data.  Boxplots for time, subject, entry, and
display are shown in Figure 49.  Nonparametric tests again indicated significant
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Boxplot of Pitch_var_deg vs Display
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 49.  Boxplots of pitch variance for elapsed time, entry, display, and subject.
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Throttle
The variance of the throttle movements were also recorded in the same fashion as
for pitch and bank.  A graphical summary of the data is shown in Figure 50.  The data is
obviously not normal, with high kurtosis and large outliers.  The boxplot in Figure 51
shows that, as with pitch and bank, a large amount of the variance occurs at the later parts
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Figure 50.  Data summary for throttle movements.















































































































































Boxplot of Throttle_var_pos vs Display
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 51.  Boxplot of throttle movement by time, entry, display, and subject.
Summary statistics of flight error
An analysis of flight errors was accomplished for both the lateral and vertical
flight paths.  The flight paths of the runs was examined and compared against the
required lateral flight path and the required vertical flight path.  The extent and duration




A probability plot of the vertical extent error (Figure 52a) shows that the





























































Probability Plot of Vert_error_3rt
Normal - 95% CI
Figure 52.  Probability plots of vertical error and third root transformation.
Figure 53 shows that interactions may exist between the display and entry
variable, so this was included in the model.  An ANOVA was then run on the third root
of the vertical error extent measure, with the results shown in Table 25.
Table 25. Analysis of Variance for Vertical_error_3rt, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Analysis of Variance for Vertical_error_3rt, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source          DF   Seq SS   Adj SS  Adj MS     F      P
Subject         14  28.6579  28.2712  2.0194  3.73  0.000
Display          1   0.0002   0.0014  0.0014  0.00  0.959
Entry            2   0.1347   0.1926  0.0963  0.18  0.837
Display*Entry    2   0.2742   0.2742  0.1371  0.25  0.777
Error          112  60.7092  60.7092  0.5420
Total          131  89.7762
The residuals plots (Figure 54) show no violation of assumptions of constant error

















Interaction Plot (fitted means) for Vertical_error_3rt





























































Normal Probability Plot of the Residuals Residuals Versus the Fitted Values
Histogram of the Residuals Residuals Versus the Order of the Data
Residual Plots for Vertical_error_3rt
Figure 54.  Residuals plots for third root of vertical error extent.
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Next, the altitude error duration was examined.  Figure 55 shows that the
distribution is not normal, and Figure 56 shows that interactions exist between the display
variable and the location of error variable.  To eliminate this interaction, the errors at
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Interaction Plot (data means) for Time_of_error
Figure 56.  Interaction plot of altitude error duration vs. location of error.
For the intercept location, the data was non-normal and transformations failed to
achieve normality.  Nonparametric tests (Kruskal-Wallis) detected significant difference
between subjects (p=0.012) and marginally significant results for display (0.077) and
entry (0.078).
For the FAF, the data was non-normal, but a square root transformation
normalized the data.  An ANOVA was run, with the results shown in Table 26 but failed
to detect any significant differences.  The residuals plots (Figure 57) again confirm
normality and constant variance of error terms.
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Table 26.  ANOVA for square root of error duration at FAF.
Analysis of Variance for Time_Sqrt, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source         DF  Seq SS  Adj SS  Adj MS     F      P
Order           1   0.016   0.014   0.014  0.01  0.942
Subject        10  51.662  43.354   4.335  1.72  0.195
Display         1   0.577   0.451   0.451  0.18  0.681
Entry           2   1.748   1.730   0.865  0.34  0.717
Display*Entry   2   1.542   1.542   0.771  0.30  0.743
Error          11  27.806  27.806   2.528
















































Normal Probability Plot of the Residuals Residuals Versus the Fitted Values
Histogram of the Residuals Residuals Versus the Order of the Data
Residual Plots for Time_Sqrt
Figure 57.  Residuals plots for square root of vertical error duration at FAF.
For the MDA, the square root transformation again normalized the data.  The
ANOVA results shown in Table 27 failed to detect any significant differences.  The
residuals plots in Figure 58 confirm the assumptions of normalcy and constant variance
of error terms.
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Table 27. ANOVA for square root of vertical error duration at MDA.
Analysis of Variance for Time_Sqrt, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source         DF  Seq SS  Adj SS  Adj MS     F      P
Order           1   0.016   0.014   0.014  0.01  0.942
Subject        10  51.662  43.354   4.335  1.72  0.195
Display         1   0.577   0.451   0.451  0.18  0.681
Entry           2   1.748   1.730   0.865  0.34  0.717
Display*Entry   2   1.542   1.542   0.771  0.30  0.743
Error          11  27.806  27.806   2.528
















































Normal Probability Plot of the Residuals Residuals Versus the Fitted Values
Histogram of the Residuals Residuals Versus the Order of the Data
Residual Plots for Time_Sqrt
Figure 58.  Residuals plots of square root of vertical error duration at MDA.
Lateral errors
A data summary for lateral error is shown in Figure 59.  The data shows a skew to
the left and high kurtosis.  A normal score transformation succeeded in normalizing the
data, although this will make the actual values of the transformed variable less
meaningful.
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AN ANOVA was run on the lateral error normal scores.  The results are shown in
Table 28.  All variables were significant to the _=0.05 level.  A check of interactions
(Figure 60) shows an interaction between location and entry.  As a result, this interaction
was included in the model.  When the model was run again, the means across the levels
of the entry variable could no longer be distinguished.  Figure 61 shows that the residuals
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Figure 59.  Data summary for lateral error.
Table 28.  ANOVA for lateral error normal score.
Analysis of Variance for Error_NormScore, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source                 DF    Seq SS    Adj SS   Adj MS      F      P
Subject                14   42.1582   42.7764   3.0555   4.47  0.000
Display                 1    3.4733    3.3063   3.3063   4.83  0.029
Order                   5   10.1737   10.5152   2.1030   3.07  0.010
EntryNumber             2    4.5195    2.8653   1.4327   2.09  0.125
Location                2   34.2315   32.7398  16.3699  23.92  0.000
EntryNumber*Location    4   18.4494   18.4494   4.6123   6.74  0.000
Error                 295  201.8667  201.8667   0.6843
Total                 323  314.8723
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Comparisons between levels of subject showed that subject 3 was significantly different
than all other subjects (p<0.0065) except for subject 11.  All levels of location of error
were significant (p<0.04), and there were significant differences detected between the
first and fifth runs (p=0.0255) and the fourth and fifth runs (p=0.0082).  Pairwise
comparisons between the interaction term yielded the results shown in Table 29.


















Interaction Plot (data means) for Error_NormScore



















































Normal Probability Plot of the Residuals Residuals Versus the Fitted Values
Histogram of the Residuals Residuals Versus the Order of the Data
Residual Plots for Error_NormScore
Figure 61.  Residual plots for normal score of lateral error.
Table 29.  Pairwise comparison p-values for lateral error interaction term.
Clear_Outbound Clear_Intercept Clear_Final Ambiguous_Outbound Ambiguous_Intercept Ambiguous_Final Conflicting_Outbound Conflicting_Intercept Conflicting_Final
Clear_Outbound NA 0.9710 1.0000 0.5200 0.9972 0.4207 0.0000 0.9908 0.4286
Clear_Intercept NA 0.8919 0.9954 1.0000 0.0297 0.0028 1.0000 0.0317
Clear_Final NA 0.3129 0.9763 0.6148 0.0000 0.9500 0.6230
Ambiguous_Outbound NA 0.9567 0.0006 0.0329 0.9844 0.0007
Ambiguous_Intercept NA 0.0768 0.0006 1.0000 0.0804
Ambiguous_Final NA 0.0000 0.0540 1.0000
Conflicting_Outbound NA 0.0015 0.0000
Conflicting_Intercept NA 0.0579
The main effects plot shown in Figure 62 shows that greater error occurred during







































































































































Main Effects Plot (data means) for Error_NormScore
Figure 62.  Main effects plot for lateral error normal score.
Off-nominal situations
As mentioned previously, subjects 7 through 16 were presented with a seventh
scenario in which an engine failure forced them to abandon or deviate from the
procedure.  For the latter choice, these cases would represent cases of intentional
noncompliance, as opposed to the unintentional noncompliance addressed by the analysis
of error above.  In addition to these engine-failure cases were several cases from the
nominal approaches in which pilots deviated intentionally from the written procedure.
This section will discuss the results of those cases.
Intentional noncompliance during non-engine failure scenarios
When given the conflicting entry scenario (for both display levels), three subjects
did not turn outbound at the IAF.  Outbound in those scenarios would be a left turn.
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Instead, they turned right nearly 270º, then proceeded outbound and commenced the
approach.  The reason stated in every instance (6 in all – 3 subjects, 2 scenarios each) was
to minimize the time on the “non-maneuvering” or “non-protected” side.
In addition, one subject performed a “reverse racetrack”.  For the conflicting entry
scenario this subject turned left, but did not intercept the course outbound.  Instead, the
participant paralleled the course outbound, and then turned left to intercept the inbound
course to the FAF.  This is in violation of the procedure, since a right turn is required
back inbound.  However, a right turn from the position this participant encountered
would have put the aircraft outside of or dangerously close to the boundary of the
protected airspace for the approach.
Intentional noncompliance during engine failure scenarios
When given the engine failure, all subjects chose to turn and attempt to intercept
the final approach course off of the NDB.  5 of the subjects intercepted the final course,
but only 2 maintained it for any period of time, and those subjects eventually drifted off
course.  No subjects made it to the runway.
Recall score for intentional noncompliance scenarios
The above scenarios were added to the engine failure scenarios, and recall of
lateral position was scored in an identical manner as for the other scenarios.  The dotplot
of the scores for the nine deviant scenarios are shown in Figure 63.  The data passed tests
of normality despite the small number of data points.  The ANOVA is shown in Table 30,
and indicates that the difference in means between the levels of the entry variable were
marginally significant.  Figure 64 indicates an interaction between display and entry, so











Dotplot of Recall_Score vs Entry, Display
Figure 63.  Dotplot of recall scores by entry and display.
Table 30.  ANOVA of recall score for intentional noncompliance scenarios
Analysis of Variance for Recall_Score, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source         DF  Seq SS  Adj SS  Adj MS     F      P
Display         1   3.667   0.729   0.729  0.32  0.583
Entry           2  12.383  16.143   8.072  3.55  0.065
Display*Entry   2   4.681   4.681   2.340  1.03  0.390
Error          11  25.033  25.033   2.276


















Interaction Plot (data means) for Recall_Score
Figure 64.  Interaction plot of display and entry for intentional noncompliance recall score.
The plot of residuals (Figure 65) shows no departures from normality or constant
variance.  Figure 66 shows the main effects for the entry variable, and pairwise
comparisons indicated that the means for the clear entry were marginally different

















































Normal Probability Plot of the Residuals Residuals Versus the Fitted Values
Histogram of the Residuals Residuals Versus the Order of the Data
Residual Plots for Recall_Score























Main Effects Plot (data means) for Recall_Score
Figure 66.  Means for intentional noncompliance recall score by entry.
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Workload
Workload was rated using the NASA TLX scale as previously.  The results were
again normalized across subject.  The boxplot of workload scores by display are shown in
Figure 67.  The boxplot of workload scores by entry are shown in Figure 68.
The boxplots do not appear to indicate any identifiable effect by display or effort.
Due to the small number of data points (one per subject for subjects 7 through 16),

















































































































Boxplot of Relative_Men, Relative_Phy, Relative_Tem, ... vs Display























































































































Boxplot of Relative_Men, Relative_Phy, Relative_Tem, ... vs Entry
Figure 68.  Boxplot of workload scores by entry.
Summary
Table 31 summarizes the main results from this section.  In addition, the
following findings will be discussed in the next chapter:
• All large errors on the non-maneuvering side occurred without the display
of procedure context.
• Maneuvers other than the 45-180 were used in only 6 out of 90 runs.
• Three subjects used maneuvers that intentionally violated the procedure;
these occurred for both display cases with the conflicting entry.
• When given an engine failure, no subjects completely abandoned the
procedure; instead, subjects tried to track the inbound course.
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• Statistical tests failed to detect an improvement for the enhanced display
on the engine failure scenarios.
Table 31.  Summary of results.







Recall of lateral position
Enhanced display improved 
recall (p=0.020)
No effect Yes/No
Recall of vertical position
Enhanced display improved 
recall (p<0.001)
No effect Yes/No
Recall of speed deviations No effect No effect No/No
Workload No effect No effect Yes/Yes
Control movements No effect No effect Yes/Yes
Altitude error No effect No effect No/Yes
Lateral error






The results support several important and novel conclusions.  First, the results
show that a display enhanced with procedure context information improved subjects’
situation awareness and performance during nominal operation of the procedure turn IAP.
This suggests that adding procedure context can reduce potentially dangerous procedure-
following errors that have been shown to be prevalent in aviation and other domains.
Secondly, the results demonstrate that dynamic displays can be used for this
purpose.  Pilots were able to understand and utilize the information on the displays
without additional workload.  Due to experimental concerns, the additional elements
represented modest (and perhaps not optimal) changes to the static display, but were still
able to produce a measurable improvement.  Applying a more principled analysis would
likely yield even better results.
In addition, the results demonstrate that not only will pilots not comply with
procedures in ways that are difficult to predict, but also that noncompliance may be a
normal and safe adaptation to unusual task conditions.  The subject who performed the
“wrong-way” racetrack, although violating the procedure, actually made the correct
choice.  The subject’s aircraft was on the non-protected side of the approach course, and
a procedurally correct right turn would have extended the aircraft further into the non-
protected airspace and perhaps outside of it (as was nearly done in other cases).  So the
noncompliant left turn was safer than the compliant right turn.  This is in contradiction to
the normal categorization of noncompliance as always wrong.
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The display did not appear to change pilot’s behavior with regard to
noncompliance, however.  In the cases of noncompliance, and in the cases of ill-advised
compliance to procedure, the actions of the pilots were the same regardless of display.  It
was hoped that the display would have some effect on behavior, but the few instances of
noncompliance, and the modest changes made to the displays (necessary to preserve
controllability of the experiment), probably prevented any effects from presenting
themselves.
Another interesting finding is that a pilot’s ability to comprehend noncompliance
appears to be limited.  While interested in and able to detect noncompliance, she or he
may not be able to interpret the consequences of that noncompliance.  This suggests that
the design of displays and procedures should consider providing support for
comprehension of the implications of noncompliance, and not just for detecting
noncompliance.
In addition, the results demonstrate that pilots attempted to use procedure
information even when clearly outside the scope of the procedure.  In the voluntary cases
of noncompliance and in the impelled cases (engine failure scenarios), pilots still
attempted to follow the relevant parts of the procedure.   In some cases, noncompliance
may have been a necessary (or at least acceptable) adaptation to the specific task
conditions, which contradicts the typical assumption that all noncompliance is
undesirable.  This means that procedures and procedure-support aids should consider
operation outside of its normal bounds in their design, rather than only for nominal
operation as is currently the case.
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The results failed to provide evidence that the enhanced display supported
situation awareness or performance in such off-nominal situations.  Although the display
did not increase workload during off-nominal situations, statistical tests failed to
conclude that the improvements in situation awareness and safety caused by the display
were significant.  This is likely due to the small number of cases induced by the
experiment design, and the large variance that typifies the aviation domain.
Finally, the results extend the findings of Ockerman (2000), where a static display
of procedure context was found to reduce over-reliance in an inspection task.  Here the
task was dynamic, and procedure context was able to reduce error and increase situation
awareness.
General results
The results of the dissertation research confirm the results of the preliminary
experiment in that subjects used a heuristic strategy to fly the approach.  Only four
subjects varied their method of accomplishing the procedure, despite the entries being
specifically chosen for their convenient alignment with different maneuvers.  Most
subjects chose one maneuver with which they were familiar, and used that regardless of
its convenience.
The use of the 45-180 maneuver may be due to its being explicitly depicted on the
approach plate, which was reviewed carefully and mentioned by every subject when
practicing and preparing for the approaches.  In addition, the 45-180 maneuver is the
most common entry used in training, so pilots may be most familiar with that entry.
However, since training may vary, this finding may not hold if the experiment were
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repeated with a different pool of pilots, as this experiment was limited to one flying
club’s members.
The preliminary experiment also found that pilots were unable to comprehend the
consequences of noncompliance for the procedure.  In the dissertation research, three
pilots utilized non-standard maneuvers for entering the procedure and for course reversal.
These maneuvers were accomplished for the conflicting entry only, but for both display
cases that used that entry.
One of the pilots made a “reverse” racetrack, where the outbound leg was on the
unprotected side of the approach course.  This is not necessarily in violation of the
procedure.  However, the turn inbound is depicted on the approach plate; it should be a
right turn, so the left hand turn made by this pilot is in violation of the procedure.
Despite this, the decision by the pilot was safer than a right turn.  A different pilot who
flew outbound on the unprotected side but made a right turn came within _ mile of the
primary obstacle clearance area.  In this case the decision to violate procedure may have
been a good one.
The two other pilots who performed non-standard entries did not initially turn
outbound; instead, these pilots made a 270º turn to align themselves better for the 45-180
maneuver outbound.  One of these pilots explicitly mentioned that this was to prevent
straying too far on the unprotected side.  However, the maneuver would result in the
pilots crossing the IAF twice, the second time after a delay while the 270º turn is
completed.  The air traffic controller (who may not have an indication on radar of where
the airplanes on approach are) would have expected that this airspace to be vacated by
this time.  The delay may place aircraft following on the approach too close to the aircraft
141
ahead.  In this case the noncompliance, although well-intentioned, was not advisable.
These pilots, much like pilots in the preliminary experiment, did not fully comprehend
the consequences of their noncompliance.
It had been intended that the conflicting entry scenario would produce frequent
intentional deviations from procedure instead of only for these three pilots.  However, the
subjects’ adherence to the one-strategy approach appears to have prevented this.  This
strategy, while perhaps not optimal (it lead to the one aircraft coming within _ mile of the
edge of the primary obstacle clearance airspace), has two benefits:  (1) it can be practiced
repeatedly to gain skill at implementing it, and (2) subjects do not have to try to interpret
the effects of a new strategy.
Enhanced display improved situation awareness for nominal situations
The enhanced display improved subjects’ recall of altitude and lateral position for
the nominal situations, suggesting that subjects’ situation awareness was improved by the
enhanced display.  By improving situation awareness, it is hoped that pilots would be
better able to correct for errors.  The finding that lateral errors were reduced further
supports this assertion.
For the off-nominal situations, the enhanced display did not appear to improve
recall.  The small number of off-nominal cases (the 9 engine-failure scenarios plus the 4
cases of intentional noncompliance during the nominal scenarios) made finding results
difficult.  However, little indication was given that a larger number of trials would have
generated a significant result.
The results do not provide any suggestions as to why this would be the case.  In
off-nominal situations, subjects rely on their knowledge of the system to interpret the
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effect of their actions (Rasmussen, 1986).  Although information to support this behavior
was provided (e.g. the indications of where the protected airspace was), either the
information was not sufficient, or the pilot did not have enough time to consider it
adequately.  If the former were the case, additional information (such as more clearly
interpreted navigation information) would help; for the latter case, a reduction in
workload would help.
The enhanced display did not affect workload
The presence of the enhanced display did not increase either subjective workload
assessments or objective indications of workload (as given by control movements) in any
case.  The subjective measures of workload, however, did show indications of order
effect in that earlier experimental runs were rated as more difficult and as incurring lower
performance.  However, no indication of order effect was seen in any of the objective
measures such as error or control movements.  This suggests that the subjective workload
impression of the subjects did not affect their performance.
Better displays of procedure context would be expected to reduce workload.  For
the purposes of this study, however, a reduction in workload would have, by itself,
improved performance and recall.  This would cause the effect of reduced workload to be
confounded with the effect of the display elements. The finding that workload was not
altered by the display therefore supports the notion that the results were due to the
presence of the information and not any particular effect on the task itself.
The subjective workload measures were overall measures (not broken down by
position on the approach) and varied by subject.  The objective measures of workload
were given by the control movements, with greater variance in control movements
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indicative of higher workload.  These also varied by subject, but could be broken down
by position on the approach.  These measures indicated a substantial increase in workload
at the end of the approach which coincided with a decrease in error.  This increase in
workload toward the end of the approach may have caused there to be no concrete effect
of the display on situation awareness of speed and missed approach errors.
The enhanced display improved safety for the nominal cases
Lateral error was reduced in the enhanced display cases for the nominal scenarios.
This finding is supported by there being no significant errors on the non-maneuvering
side when using the enhanced display.  These results suggest that the enhanced display
was successful in increasing safety, at least in the lateral plane.
As mentioned, the increase in situation awareness may explain the reduction in
error, although a similar increase in situation awareness of altitude errors did not result in
a reduction in those errors.  Moreover, anytime there is an increase in situation
awareness, it is difficult (if not impossible) to de-confound the effect on safety.  In
practical terms, it may not be particularly important, since the desire to increase situation
awareness has as its goal to increase safety.
That a lateral effect but not an altitude effect would be found is somewhat
surprising since the enhanced display seems to provide more direct support for altitude
compliance rather than track compliance.  No concrete evidence indicates why the
display did not support altitude compliance, but three possible reasons are presented here.
First, it is important to note that the scale of altitude deviations (as compared to lateral
deviations) is different.  Altitude deviations are measured in 100s of feet, whereas lateral
deviations are typically 1000s of feet or even miles.
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Secondly, there is an instrument that directly indicates altitude (the altimeter).
Therefore, errors are directly displayed to the pilot, whereas lateral errors must be
gleaned from cross-checking two instruments (at least for this task).  This makes altitude
errors much more obvious than lateral errors, with or without procedure context elements.
In addition, the simulator’s characteristics were different for the two axes.  The
simulated aircraft was very stable laterally, but not very stable in the pitch axis.  This
meant that corrections to lateral errors could be made and not tracked, whereas
corrections to vertical errors needed to be continuously monitored.  Since detection of
deviations was not closely measured, it is not possible to prove this explanation.
However, this type of control behavior could overwhelm any visible effect of the display
on corrections to altitude deviations.
Implications of the findings
The findings suggest that support for procedure following in both nominal and
off-nominal situations is needed.  Pilots relied upon a heuristic strategy in most cases,
strategies which may not be adequate in all circumstances (even if they are allowed by
the procedure).  In cases where pilots did not rely on these heuristic strategies, they
appeared to be unable to comprehend the consequences of their noncompliance.
Displays of even simple elements of procedure context appear to help.  In the
experiments in this dissertation, they reduced error and increased situation awareness in
nominal situations.  Additional work needs to be done to determine how to extend these
benefits to the off-nominal situations.
The findings should generalize to other highly proceduralized domains.  As
mentioned in Chapter 1, procedures and checklists are one of the most frequent
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contributors to accidents.  The need for improvements in procedure-following is therefore
similar to that of aviation.  In addition, researchers in numerous domains have found that
humans use heuristic strategies to accomplish tasks.   It is therefore unsurprising to find it
here in a high-workload task, and it would be equally unsurprising to find it in other tasks
in other domains.  Is such cases, procedure context information can potentially increase
situation awareness and reduce error.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions and Recommendations for Future Work
Aviation is one of many highly proceduralized, safety-critical domains.  In these
domains, procedures are relied upon for safe and efficient operations, and failure to
follow procedures is frequently cited as a cause of accidents.  Yet support for procedure
following has been minimal and in general has not utilized the full capabilities of current
technology.  Before those capabilities can be leveraged, however, a disciplined approach
to how technology can be used to support procedure following should be developed.
This dissertation represents an early effort at defining an approach.
Procedures couple operators to their system.  It defines a sequence of interactions
with the system which will achieve a particular goal.  As such a procedure provides a
method of accomplishing the task which is known to be successful, but also provides
predictability and standardization.
The predictability that procedures provide is also a source of information which is
often extremely useful to other operators in the system.  The preliminary experiment in
this dissertation attempted to utilize that information directly, with mixed results.  The
pilots in that task were apparently able to comprehend the meaning of the information,
but were unable to comprehend the consequences for the system when the underlying
rationale for the procedure was no longer valid.
Of course, the predictability of the procedure is not absolute.  In addition to the
normal sources of uncertainty present in the environment, the coupling provided by
procedures is dependent upon the less-than-deterministic human operator.
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The operators in the experiments described in this dissertation were following
procedures.  In one case the procedure was novel and was designed in part to expect
adherence to procedure. In a second case the procedure was well-established and well-
known by the pilots.  In neither case did pilots perfectly comply with procedures.  They
improvised based on their understanding of the situation; they did not expect that the
procedure had been designed in consideration of the situation they encountered.   Despite
the controlled circumstances of the experimental environment, in some cases the pilots
were justified in not complying with procedure.
Whether justified or not, and whether due to environmental uncertainty, their own
actions, or the actions of others in the system, operators may find themselves outside of
the situations envisioned by the procedure designer.  In any case, this research has
suggested that operators may still follow a procedure or make use of portions of a
procedure.  Therefore, displays for procedure following should support operation in both
nominal and off-nominal situations.  In systems with multiple operators, this support is
even more critical.
In the dissertation research, the context of procedures, information which is
utilized to design the procedures but is often not present in its implementation, was used
to design an aid for pilots to fly an instrument approach.  This information provided
significant benefits to the pilot, increasing situation awareness and decreasing lateral
navigation errors during nominal situations.  However, the results were unable to
demonstrate these benefits for off-nominal situations.
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Future work
The results of the experiment do not suggest an explanation for why procedure
context did not assist pilots during off-nominal situations.  It could be that these off-
nominal situations require different information than is contained in the procedure
context.  It could also be that the modest changes made for this experiment were
insufficient to provide detectable benefits.
Future research should investigate whether procedure context is useful for off-
nominal situations.  Different tasks may allow more significant changes to be made to the
interface, or other parts of procedure context could be added.  In addition, some analysis
of the utility of certain information for off-nominal situations could identify what would
be helpful.
In addition, different procedure context elements, or modifications to the
procedure context elements, should be investigated, particularly for dynamic displays.
Hierarchical techniques used for designing displays, such as Ecological Interface Design
(Vicente & Rasmussen, 1992) could be useful for this purpose.
For the two experiments described herein, no changes were made to the actual
procedure.  The analysis which identified procedure context elements could also identify
desirable changes to the underlying procedure.  The full utility of procedure context can
be examined by testing such changes.
Within aviation, research should be extended to general aviation and maintenance.
From 1988 to 1997, the accident rate for general aviation was over 20 times higher than
for commercial operations, with over 5 times as many fatalities (Goldman, Fiedler, &
King, 2002).  Moreover, due to the expense of certifying and purchasing equipment,
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general aviation aircraft generally do not benefit from new displays.  As a result,
improvements in the design of flight deck procedures may be a promising method for
increasing safety.
A report by Britain’s Civil Aviation Authority identified aircraft maintenance as a
contributing factor for 12 percent of air transport accidents from 1959 to 1983, a figure
that increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Safety Regulation Group, 2002).
Aircraft maintenance is another highly proceduralized domain and could significantly
benefit from improvements in procedure support.
As mentioned, this work has implications for other highly proceduralized
domains.  Research should be undertaken to see how procedure context can benefit
domains such as medicine, maritime, industrial, and chemical.
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Appendix 1
Experiment Forms and Questionnaires
Demographic questionnaire









To your knowledge, have you ever operated an aircraft into or out of
Millville Municipal airport in New Jersey? __________________________




1. On the map attached, indicate the initial position of the aircraft and the track of
the aircraft, including missed approach.
2. Did you remain above 2000 feet until established on the inbound course?  If no,
please indicate why you did not.
3. Did you remain above 1300 feet until past the FAF?  If no, please indicate why
you did not.
4. Did you remain above the MDA at all times?  If no, please indicate why you did
not.
5. Please indicate whether you recall dropping below approach speed.  If so, please
indicate the frequency, duration, and magnitude of the deviations you recall.
6. Please indicate any deviations from the missed approach procedure that you

























Table A2-1.  Tabulated statistics of subject, entry, and display for recall of lateral trajectory.
Rows: Subject   Columns: Entry / Display
            Ambiguous               Clear              Conflicting        All
       Baseline  Enhanced    Baseline  Enhanced    Baseline  Enhanced      All
1         6.000     7.000       3.000     8.000       3.000     6.000    5.500
          6.000     7.000       3.000     8.000       3.000     6.000    6.000
              *         *           *         *           *         *    2.074
2         4.000     7.000       7.000     4.000       2.000     6.000    5.000
          4.000     7.000       7.000     4.000       2.000     6.000    5.000
              *         *           *         *           *         *    2.000
3         4.000     6.000       3.000     4.000       8.000     8.000    5.500
          4.000     6.000       3.000     4.000       8.000     8.000    5.000
              *         *           *         *           *         *    2.168
4         4.000     7.000       5.000     2.000       5.000     8.000    5.167
          4.000     7.000       5.000     2.000       5.000     8.000    5.000
              *         *           *         *           *         *    2.137
5         2.000     6.000       3.000     5.000       6.000     8.000    5.000
          2.000     6.000       3.000     5.000       6.000     8.000    5.500
              *         *           *         *           *         *    2.191
6         4.000     8.000       4.000     7.000       6.000     7.000    6.000
          4.000     8.000       4.000     7.000       6.000     7.000    6.500
              *         *           *         *           *         *    1.673
7         6.000     6.000       4.000     2.000       6.000     7.000    5.167
          6.000     6.000       4.000     2.000       6.000     7.000    6.000
              *         *           *         *           *         *    1.835
8         4.000     7.000       5.000     3.000       3.000     6.000    4.667
          4.000     7.000       5.000     3.000       3.000     6.000    4.500
              *         *           *         *           *         *    1.633
9         7.000     2.000       8.000     7.000       7.000     5.000    6.000
          7.000     2.000       8.000     7.000       7.000     5.000    7.000
              *         *           *         *           *         *    2.191
10        8.000     8.000       8.000     7.000       7.000     7.000    7.500
          8.000     8.000       8.000     7.000       7.000     7.000    7.500
              *         *           *         *           *         *    0.548
11        5.000     7.000       8.000     6.000       5.000     6.000    6.167
          5.000     7.000       8.000     6.000       5.000     6.000    6.000
              *         *           *         *           *         *    1.169
12        7.000     7.000       7.000     6.000       6.000     7.000    6.667
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          7.000     7.000       7.000     6.000       6.000     7.000    7.000
              *         *           *         *           *         *    0.516
14        6.000     8.000       6.000     8.000       6.000     5.000    6.500
          6.000     8.000       6.000     8.000       6.000     5.000    6.000
              *         *           *         *           *         *    1.225
15        4.000     7.000       5.000     6.000       5.000     3.000    5.000
          4.000     7.000       5.000     6.000       5.000     3.000    5.000
              *         *           *         *           *         *    1.414
16        8.000     8.000       5.000     6.000       5.000     6.000    6.333
          8.000     8.000       5.000     6.000       5.000     6.000    6.000
              *         *           *         *           *         *    1.366
All       5.267     6.733       5.400     5.400       5.333     6.333    5.744
          5.000     7.000       5.000     6.000       6.000     6.000    6.000
          1.751     1.486       1.844     1.993       1.633     1.345    1.739
Cell Contents:  Recall_Score  :  Mean
                Recall_Score  :  Median
                Recall_Score  :  Standard deviation
Table A2-2.  Tabulated statistics for subjects, entry, and display for altitude recall.
            Ambiguous               Clear              Conflicting         All
       Baseline  Enhanced    Baseline  Enhanced    Baseline  Enhanced       All
1         3.000     3.000       2.000     3.000       2.000     3.000     2.667
          3.000     3.000       2.000     3.000       2.000     3.000     3.000
              *         *           *         *           *         *    0.5164
              1         1           1         1           1         1         6
2         3.000     3.000       3.000     2.000       2.000     3.000     2.667
          3.000     3.000       3.000     2.000       2.000     3.000     3.000
              *         *           *         *           *         *    0.5164
              1         1           1         1           1         1         6
3         3.000     3.000       3.000     3.000       3.000     3.000     3.000
          3.000     3.000       3.000     3.000       3.000     3.000     3.000
              *         *           *         *           *         *    0.0000
              1         1           1         1           1         1         6
4         1.000     2.000       3.000     3.000       3.000     3.000     2.500
          1.000     2.000       3.000     3.000       3.000     3.000     3.000
              *         *           *         *           *         *    0.8367
              1         1           1         1           1         1         6
5         2.000     2.000       1.000     3.000       1.000     3.000     2.000
          2.000     2.000       1.000     3.000       1.000     3.000     2.000
              *         *           *         *           *         *    0.8944
              1         1           1         1           1         1         6
6         2.000     3.000       2.000     3.000       3.000     2.000     2.500
          2.000     3.000       2.000     3.000       3.000     2.000     2.500
              *         *           *         *           *         *    0.5477
              1         1           1         1           1         1         6
7         1.000     3.000       2.000     3.000       2.000     3.000     2.333
          1.000     3.000       2.000     3.000       2.000     3.000     2.500
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              *         *           *         *           *         *    0.8165
              1         1           1         1           1         1         6
8         1.000     2.000       3.000     3.000       1.000     2.000     2.000
          1.000     2.000       3.000     3.000       1.000     2.000     2.000
              *         *           *         *           *         *    0.8944
              1         1           1         1           1         1         6
9         2.000     3.000       2.000     3.000       3.000     3.000     2.667
          2.000     3.000       2.000     3.000       3.000     3.000     3.000
              *         *           *         *           *         *    0.5164
              1         1           1         1           1         1         6
10        3.000     3.000       3.000     3.000       3.000     3.000     3.000
          3.000     3.000       3.000     3.000       3.000     3.000     3.000
              *         *           *         *           *         *    0.0000
              1         1           1         1           1         1         6
11        3.000     3.000       3.000     3.000       3.000     3.000     3.000
          3.000     3.000       3.000     3.000       3.000     3.000     3.000
              *         *           *         *           *         *    0.0000
              1         1           1         1           1         1         6
12        3.000     2.000       3.000     3.000       2.000     3.000     2.667
          3.000     2.000       3.000     3.000       2.000     3.000     3.000
              *         *           *         *           *         *    0.5164
              1         1           1         1           1         1         6
14        3.000     3.000       3.000     3.000       3.000     3.000     3.000
          3.000     3.000       3.000     3.000       3.000     3.000     3.000
              *         *           *         *           *         *    0.0000
              1         1           1         1           1         1         6
15        3.000     3.000       2.000     3.000       3.000     3.000     2.833
          3.000     3.000       2.000     3.000       3.000     3.000     3.000
              *         *           *         *           *         *    0.4082
              1         1           1         1           1         1         6
16        3.000     3.000       2.000     3.000       2.000     3.000     2.667
          3.000     3.000       2.000     3.000       2.000     3.000     3.000
              *         *           *         *           *         *    0.5164
              1         1           1         1           1         1         6
All       2.400     2.733       2.467     2.933       2.400     2.867     2.633
          3.000     3.000       3.000     3.000       3.000     3.000     3.000
         0.8281    0.4577      0.6399    0.2582      0.7368    0.3519    0.6080
             15        15          15        15          15        15        90
Cell Contents:  Vert_Score  :  Mean
                Vert_Score  :  Median
                Vert_Score  :  Standard deviation
                               Count
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